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The Struggle over Immigration:
Indentured Servants, Slaves,
and Articles of Commerce
Mary Sarah Bilder"
A long time ago, but not too long ago,
Ships came from across the sea
Bringing Pilgrims and prayer-makers,
Adventurers and booty seekers,
Free men and indentured servants,
Slave men and slave masters, all new-
To a new world, America!
-Langston Hughes'
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I. INTRODUCTION
People are articles of commerce, or so the United States Supreme Court
held in 1941, emphasizing that the issue was "settled beyond question."2 At
the time, Justice Jackson expressed some discomfort with the theory that "the
migrations of a human being... [are] commerce."3 The Court, however,
has not wavered from this analytical position. Indeed, like many legal
constructs, it has inspired little reflection.
Modem immigration law scholarship has been more interested in exploring
the idea that immigration power is "an incident of sovereignty," than puzzling
over people as articles of commerce. The inherent sovereignty or plenary
power doctrine, however, was the second theory of immigration authority-not
adopted until 1889.' For the first one hundred years, the Court debated the
question of immigration power under the Commerce Clause. The
consequences of this unsettled jurisprudence reappear in every constitutional
law casebook: the classic line of commerce cases stretching from Gibbons,'
through Miln,6 to The Passenger Cases.7  In 1876, the Court finally
2. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (striking down a statute
making it a misdemeanor to bring nonresident indigents into state).
3. Id at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson noted that such a theory could
result in "denaturing human rights." He suggested using the privileges and immunities
clause to protect interstate migrations of indigents.
4. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
609 (1889). For most of the twentieth century the Court has followed this later theory.
See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAvID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS
AND POLICY 15-16 (1985); DAvID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
IN A NuTSHELL 49-51 (3d ed. 1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-53 (1990); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989).
5. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
7. The Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner, Norris v. Boston), 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849). Constitutional historians still puzzle over-and now rarely read-the
lengthy opinions of the nineteenth-century Supreme Court as the Court "groped for
formulations with little clarity or agreement." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTIONAL
LAW 218 n.2 (12th ed. 1991). Leading constitutional law books consequently present
snippets of these cases as obligatory reading for "early interpretations of the commerce
1996]
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clause," old theories of federalism, or the claimed legitimacy of state restrictions on
paupers and other undesired people. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 404-5 (2d ed. 1988); see PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 127-40 (2d ed. 1983); GUNTHER,
supra, at 217-18 n.1 1; JOHN E. NOWAK ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 nn.18-21,
264-66 (3d ed. 1986).
Most articles discussing Miln and the line of cases stretching from Gibbons v.
Ogden to the Passenger Cases interpret the cases from the perspective of federal-state
relations and powers. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the
Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1328-30 (1994); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of
American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1373-74, 1397 (1994); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 791-92 (1994); Peter
J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era ofDemi-Sovereignties,35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 121, 136-37 (1994); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993); Alfred L. Brophy, Let Us Go Back and Stand upon
the Constitution: Federal-State Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
192, 200, 214-15 (1990); Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of
Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 245-46 (1989); Albert
Broderick, "To Endure for Ages to Come": A Bicentennial View of the Constitution:
From Constitutional Politics to Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court's First Fifty
Years, 65 N.C. L. REV. 945, 949-50 (1987); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: Article IVand FederalPowers, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695, 744
(1983); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and
Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 471, 474-78, 503-4, 507-8 (1983).
Even those writers who have noted these cases' relationship to slavery continue
to view the connection from a federal-state powers perspective. See, e.g., Sanford
Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1087
(1993); Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 974 (1993) (book
review). One casebook also suggests that these cases and the "exclusive power" theory
were "deeply influenced by the issue of slavery." The suggestion is advanced as the
last note in a set discussing the "fundamental framework" of regulating commerce.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 252-53 (1986). The most
consistent attempt to connect the cases to slavery appears in Carl Swisher's volume for
the Holmes Devise. See CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD: 1836-64, at 327-
423, in particular, 359-60, 365, 378, 390, 395, 396 (1974). Swisher, however,
concludes:
[U]n the conflict ofpolitical theory between nationalism and localism slavery
was only one of the critical factors. Immigration ... raised problems of
its own, quite apart from the fact that lawmaking for transportation or
exclusion of white alien passengers had implications for the transportation
or exclusion of free Negroes and slaves.
Id. at 396.
In contrast to these discussions, this article suggests that the connections among
immigration, commerce, and slavery were less those of analogy and general influence
[Vol. 61
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unanimously decided to link immigration to an exclusive federal commerce
power based on the perception that immigrants were "articles of commerce."8
Although scholars have discussed the Commerce Clause as a source of
immigration power, few have explored the reasons for the century-long
struggle over immigration power.9 As a textual matter, the struggle occurred
because the Constitution does not explicitly give Congress authority over
immigration.' This article moves beyond a textual analysis to argue that the
origins of this struggle can be found over two centuries earlier in the history
than an integral historical factor of the development of these doctrinal areas.
Scholars noting the cases' relationship to colonial immigration law have focused
on the exclusion of paupers and other incoming passengers in order to legitimize or
condemn modem immigration problems. See BREST & LEVINSON, supra at 129
(stating that Miln should be read "with the knowledge that towns had prevented the
immigration of paupers since Colonial times."); EDITH ABBOTT, IMMIGRATION:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS AND CASE RECORDS 97 (reprint ed. 1969) (1924) ("The state
passenger acts were the direct outgrowth of the poor laws, and in a few states, notably
New York and Massachusetts, were certainly only a later substitute for those sections
of the poor laws that had established a bonding system to protect the taxpayers in the
port cities and states by providing for the support of the pauper, diseased, lunatic, and
other immigrants who became chargeable."); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion
and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American
Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLuM. L. REV. 1833, 1896-1901 (1993) (this
article is further developed in a book, GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTrTUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996), which
appeared as this article was going to press); see also Benjamin Klebarer, State and
Local Immigration Regulation in the United States before 1882,3 INT'L R. Soc. HIST.
269 (1958). Indeed, a number of articles, many of them arguing against state ability
to exclude paupers, cite Miln as an example of the Court's acceptance of the exclusion
of paupers, beggars, or persons with "moral pestilence." See, e.g., Daniel Gordon,
California Retreats to the Past: The Paradox of Unenforceable Immigration Law and
Edwards v. California, the Depression, and Earl Warren, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 319, 347-
49 (1995); Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities
Act as a Moral Code, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1463 (1994); Stephen Loffredo,
Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1329 (1993);
David P. Currie, The Constitution In The Supreme Court: The Preferred-Position
Debate, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 39, 62 n.141 (1987).
8. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
9. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 7-18; see AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN,
JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION PRIMER: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 1-4
(3d ed. 1994) ("Congressional control over immigration... has been extrapolated
from its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the flow of commerce across
the national borders.").
10. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 1.
1996]
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of indentured servitude and slavery." The existence and dominance of
indentured servitude as a means of immigration ensured that early immigration
regulation operated with the assumption that people were articles of
commerce. Before Independence, this assumption went unquestioned. But as
slavery, indentured servitude, and immigration intertwined between
Independence and the end of the Civil War, this assumption-that persons
entering from abroad were "articles of commerce"-became one of the most
disputed questions of constitutional law.
My interest in exploring this early history does not lie in the implications
for modem immigration law of the commerce power theory-I leave that issue
to immigration scholars. My curiosity instead involves what Felix Frankfurter
once called "the cultural and psychological roots of legal doctrine."' 2
Modem legal scholars might term this inquiry one about legal culture. 3 But
11. One of the lawyers who argued Miln seemed unconsciously aware of the link
between early immigration law and slavery. His repetition of the word, "peculiar,"
often associated with the "peculiar institution" of slavery, underscores this article's
argument that slavery, indentured servitude, and immigration were linked in the
Court's decisions. He stated:
The law was one peculiar to this country, and it grew out of circumstances
peculiar to this country. The emigration to the United States since the
American revolution, was unprecedented in history, not merely in numbers,
but in character. . . . It was not a military colonization ... nor was it
mercantile . . . It was a constant and steady migration of civilized
Europeans to an independent country, controlled by a civilized people. This
migration was peculiar to the United States, and we cannot find legal
analogies in other countries.
Miln, 36 U.S. at 106. Miln involved an 1824 New York law that required the master
of vessels arriving in New York to report the name, age, and last legal settlement of
all passengers and to give bonds for each non-citizen passenger. The law had arisen,
according to a contemporaneous article in the North American Review, as New York
attempted to regulate "the influx of emigration, amounting now almost to a torrent,
from foreign shores." 46 THE NORTH AMERICAN REvIEw 126, 132-33 (1838).
12. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WAITE 8-9 (1937).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE
(1984); A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS:
CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810 (1981); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at xi, xiv, 1-4 (1991); William
W. Fisher, III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1051-83 (1993); Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1119 (1988); R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal
Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, 74 J. AM. HIST. 814
(1987); Kendall Thomas, Rouge et Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of
the Angelo Herndon Case, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2599 (1992).
[Vol. 61
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my goal in exploring the legal culture surrounding the idea of people as
"articles of commerce " 4 is not to trace the culture's desire to include or
exclude immigrants. My hope, instead, is to search for what Toni Morrison
describes as "the shadows of the presence from which the text has fled.""5
I believe that the Court's nineteenth-century opinions on immigration under
the Commerce Clause reveal the shadows of slaves and indentured servants.1
6
This article suggests that the relationship between the larger culture or cultures
and the legal culture is tricky. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the view
of the legal culture and the culture of indentured servants were similar in that both
perceived indentured servants to be articles of commerce. By the late nineteenth
century, the larger culture no longer perceived people as articles of commerce. This
new perception curiously permitted the legal culture to accept the assumption that
people were "articles of commerce" for the purposes of commerce clause analysis and
immigration power.
14. "Commerce" and "articles of commerce" can be seen as "cultural signifiers,
words intended to convey a bundle of associations and thereby to invoke an appeal to
values perceived to be of great importance in the culture." WHITE, supra note 13, at 4.
This article demonstrates that these legal assumptions or cultural signifiers have not
had constant or uncontested meanings. The article uses an absence of quotation marks
around the phrase-articles of commerce-to denote the perception that people were
in reality traded goods. The presence of the quotes-"articles of commerce"-refers
to the legal assumption under the Commerce Clause. Cf Mary Sarah Bilder, The
Shrinking Back: The Lmv of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1991) (exploring the
legal culture's assumptions about objectivity, intent, and the individual in the context
of intellectual property law).
15. Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-AmericanPresence
in American Literature, 28 MICH. Q. R. 1, 12 (1989).
16. These shadows continue today as recent events surrounding immigration-the
grounding of the Golden Venture in New York harbor and the discovery of Thai
workers in a California garment factory-demonstrate. Although contemporary legal
analyses might classify the immigrants involved as "articles of commerce," these
people were articles of commerce in some real sense of the phrase. They were
indentured servants. Their labor was bought and sold in exchange for transportation
to the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals noted that the Chinese
passengers aboard the Golden Venture arrived as "'indentured servants."' Chung v.
Reno, 886 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (quoting Matter of G-, Int. Dec.
3215, at 7). Similarly, the Thai immigrants worked in "involuntary servitude" because
of "inflated debts they could never repay, mostly for their transportation to this
country." NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at Al, col. 5; see NEW YORK TIMEs,
Aug. 16, 1995, at A22, col. 4.; id., Aug. 20, 1995, at E8, col. 1; id., Sept. 7, 1995, at
A28, col. 1; id, Sept. 13, 1995, at A20, col. 4; id., Sept. 21, 1995, at A16, col. 1.
The indentured servitude faced by the Chinese or Thai immigrants does not often
confront courts, lawyers, or legal academics. Indeed, courts often treat the institution
almost as a historic joke or as a description of lawyers' relationships with clients. A
repeatedly quoted Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion noted that a "client by virtue
1996]
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Studies of the origins of early immigration law have fled these shadows-
perhaps uncomfortable with a discussion of a commerce in white bound labor;
perhaps uncomfortable with the idea that the culture of American slavery left
a legacy in legal areas outside of civil rights, equal protection, and property;
perhaps uncomfortable with the suggestion that constitutional disagreements
may arise from differing cultural perceptions instead of doctrinal disputes. A
prefatory comment on bound labor seems essential. White indentured
servitude cannot be equated with the enslavement of Africans and African-
Americans. 17 Any similarities in the early seventeenth century treatment of
white indentured servants and "Negro Servants" are insignificant when
compared to the racial oppression perpetuated by the institution of American
slavery and race prejudice. Indentured servants were to become free; slaves
were to remain unfree.
18
The indentured servitude trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
however, nonetheless blurred one aspect of the distinction. Although the trade
in indentured servants was "far from the abuses of the slave trade,"'9 it too
was perceived by the colonial Anglo-American world as a form of commerce.
The indentured servants within it were considered articles of commerce. This
initial perception that immigrants were articles of commerce and the
subsequent conviction that white immigrants should not carry the same legal
label as black slaves caused a century of conflict in the development of federal
immigration law.2"
of a contract with his attorney is not made an indentured servant, a puppet on
counsel's string, nor a chair in the courtroom." Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962,
970 (5th Cir. 1970); see Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1521 (1lth
Cir. 1983). Courts have spent more time interpreting "involuntary servitude" under the
Thirteenth Amendment. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
17. For an attempt to equate the two that is both bizarre and racist, see MICHAEL
A. HOFFMAN, THEY WERE WHITE AND THEY WERE SLAVES: THE UNTOLD HISTORY
OF THE ENSLAVEMENT OF WHrrEs IN EARLY AMERICA (1991). His book, which
quotes selectively yet liberally from scholarly works on indentured servitude, claims
that "Establishment-funded and approved house scholars" have created a "cover-up"
to deny "the true history of White Slavery." Id. at 65. In his book, published by
Wiswell Ruffin House, Hoffman lists himself as the author of SECRETS OF MASONIC
MIND CONTROL and the PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF HOLOCAUST
NEWSPEAK.
18. Henry A. Gemery, Markets for Migrants: English Indentured Servitude and
Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in COLONIALISM AND
MIGRATION: INDENTURED LABOUR BEFORE AND AFTER SLAVERY 33, 50 (P.C.
Emmer ed., 1986).
19. Id.
20. The article uses "immigrant" throughout the article to refer to people who
came to British North America and the United States in a manner that can be
[Vol. 61
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/1
STRUGGLE OVER IMMIGRATION
To tell this story, this article proceeds chronologically. Part II sketches
the background of indentured servitude as a regulated form of immigration.
Part III argues that the indentured servant trade was perceived as a commerce
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.2" Part IV examines the
disappearance of the indentured servant trade between 1780-1820 and
demonstrates that the Constitution and early state statutes betrayed the legal
culture's confusion over whether immigrants were to be "articles of
commere"---"imports" or "migrants." Part V reinterprets three famous
antebellum commerce cases and one slavery case. It argues that the inability
of the Court to reach consensus arose because, as slavery became a national
concern, the Court came to profound disagreement over whether
people-particularly white European immigrants-should be considered
"articles of commerce." Part VI completes the story and proves the
significance of slavery to the struggle. In 1876, as indentured servitude
returned, post-Reconstruction perceptions led the Court unanimously to decide
that all people were "articles of commerce" and to begin the period of modem
immigration law.
II. IMMIGRANTS AS INDENTURED SERVANTS
During the colonial period, most of the laws dealing with immigration-
the voluntary transoceanic movement of people-were laws relating to
indentured servants. People did travel to British North America as paying
passengers, but the laws largely ignored this group. The colonial legislatures
were concerned with the majority of immigrants who were transported as
indentured servants. Our cultural images of early immigration are of self-
financing, religious dissidents-for example, the Pilgrims-but economic,
labor, and demographic historians have shown that the colonial concern with
indentured servants was quantitatively justified.' Because indentured
servitude has tended to be overlooked in immigration history, this section
discusses the people who came as indentured servants and what their lives
were like in British North America.
understood as at least somewhat voluntary. Prior to the late nineteenth century,
"emigrant" was actually the preferred term in legislation and secondary material.
21. Because New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia received most of
the transatlantic migration prior to and shortly after the Revolution, the article focuses
on their legislation. It includes, in addition, a discussion of New England to illuminate
the relationship between town poor laws and immigration.
22. See T.H. Breen & Stephen Foster, Moving to the New World: The Character
ofEarly Massachusetts Immigration, 30 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 189-222 (3d ser. 1973);
Anthony Salerno, The Social Background of Seventeenth-Century Emigration to
America, 19 J. BRITISH STUDIES 31, 51-52 (1979).
1996]
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Indentured servitude is part of the institution of "bound labor."'
Indentured servants were people bound to labor under a contract.24 British
and European indentured servants appear to have been the dominant labor
force until the 1680s in the British North American colonies.2 ' Around
1680, a complex series of events produced a shift in the labor force. These
changes involved, for example, a decrease in the British and European supply
of indentured servants, the entry of the British into the slave trade, new
colonial statutes that cut off traditional avenues of legal escape from lifetime
servitude for Africans and their descendants, a decrease in the opportunities
for indentured servants after servitude, increased concern about white
indentured servants who easily blended into an increasing white population,
a concern about controlling lower classes, and white prejudice about
differences between Europeans and Africans. As a product of these factors,
after 1680 the dominant form of bound labor shifted inexorably towards the
race-based, enslavement of Africans and African-Americans.26
23. See RICHARD MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 310
(1946). Robert Steinfeld argues that indented labor or contractual servitude was not
initially distinguished from wage labor. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION
OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND
CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 13 (1991). For a discussion of master-servant law and the
development of labor law, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 223-97 (1993). Immigration and labor
long have been linked. See KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE
CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820-1924 (1984).
24. See DAVID W. GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 13 (1981); MORRIS, supra note 23, at 310. The term originated
because the agreement was "by deed indented." JAMES CURTIS BALLAGH, WHITE
SERVITUDE IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA: A STUDY OF THE SYSTEM OF INDENTURED
LABOR IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 34 (1895). The term "indentured servant"
encompassed Indians, apprentices, domestic poor, debtors, convicts, foreign convicts,
and those foreigners entering the country as "servants." The use of "servant" changed
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England and the colonies. It included
anyone in a supervisorial capacity under the service of a master, a wage earner who
lived with the master for a period of years, and anyone who worked generally for a
master. See STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 17-22, 126-29. For late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century discussions of the various meanings of "servant" by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Respublica v. Catharine Keppele, 1 Yeates 233 (Pa.
1793); Ex parte Meason, 5 Binney 167 (Pa. 1812); Boniface v. Scott, 3 Serg. and
Rawle 351 (Pa. 1817).
25. See EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 105-6 (1975).
26. The historical literature on this shift is too vast to list and a number of fine
bibliographies and historiographies are available. For a recent attempt to provide an
overview, see PETER KOLCOHN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 3-27 (1993), and
[Vol. 61
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Recent estimates suggest that at least 600,000 British and Europeans
migrated to the colonies between 1650-1780.27 Many, if not most, of these
immigrants came as "imported white servants"-indentured servants. One
recent economic historian suggests that "between half and two-thirds of all
white immigrants to the American colonies after the 1630s and before
independence came under indenture."2" Another confirms that "some 60%"
of immigrants in the seventeenth century were indentured servants, as were a
"sizable share" of eighteenth-century emigrants.29 The immigrants "did not
travel to all the colonies in anything like equal numbers. 30  By the 1770s,
bibliography at 257-91. For a summary of economic issues, see JOHN J. McCusKER
& RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607-1783, at 238-45
(1985). For a summary of the debate over race and prejudice and slavery, see Alden
T. Vaughan, The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century
Virginia, 97 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 311-54 (1989).
27. GALENSON, supra note 24, at 17.
28. Id. at 3-4. Because many records are missing, estimates vary. See Farley
Grubb, The Incidence of Servitude in Trans-Atlantic Migration, 1771-1804, 22
EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 316, 317-18 & nn.2-4 (1985). Abbot Smith claimed that
"half of all persons who came to colonies south of New England were servants."
ABBOT E. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE 3-4 (1947). Edmund Morris considered
the figure of half of all people "very conservative." MORRIS, supra note 23, at 315-16.
Immigration to mainland British North America during the seventeenth century has
been estimated at 116,000 people to southern colonies and 39,000 to northern colonies.
See Henry A. Gemery, Emigration from the British Isles to the New World, 1630-1700:
Inferencesfrom Colonial Populations, 5 RESEARCH ECON. HIST. 179, 180 (1980).
29. Gemery, supra note 18, at 33, 38-39.
30. BERNARD BAILYN, VOYAGERS TO THE WEST: A PASSAGE IN PEOPLING OF
AMERICA ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 205 (1986). In 1624, 378 out of 2,500
people in Virginia were indentured servants and, at least between 1664 and 1671,
Virginia imported an average of 1,500 indentured servants per year. BALLAGH, supra
note 24, at 41. Indentured servitude also began early in Massachusetts; however, the
heavy periods of importation occurred between 1710 and 1750. See Lawrence W.
Towner, A Good Master Well Served: A Social History of Servitude in
Massachusetts, 1620-1750, at 63, 332 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation,
Northwestern University). New York received few indentured servants despite
attempts by New York's governor in 1712 and 1757 to pass laws encouraging the
importation of white indentured servants. SAMUEL MCKEE, JR., LABOR IN NEw
YORK: 1664-1776, at 90-91, 93, 94 (reprint ed. 1965) (1935). In the Delaware region,
servants could be found by 1663; and by the 1680s, 271 indentured servants were
present in Pennsylvania. By 1729, Philadelphia alone had 582 indentured servants and
within three years had 1,500. See CHEESMAN A. HERRICK, WHITE SERVITUDE IN
PENNSYLVANIA: INDENTURED AND REDEMPTION LABOR IN COLONY AND
COMMONWEALTH 27 (1926); SHARON V. SALINGER, "To SERVE WELL AND
FAITHFULLY": LABOR AND INDENTURED SERVANTS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1800, at
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93.6 percent of immigrants to the thirteen colonies arrived in New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.3' Of the many who
arrived as indentured servants, eighty-eight percent went to Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Virginia. In fact, Maryland received half of all of these
indentured servants. New York received only around eight percent and New
England absorbed an almost negligible percentage of indentured servants.32
Although the influx of indentured servants varied over the colonies and over
time, indentured servitude remained a method of migration until 1819.
Indentured servants were the immigrants who lacked the economic
resources to pay for passage. For most, indentured servitude was "one more
stage in a migratory career" of searching for employment. After moving
across England or Europe, crossing the Atlantic was their final hope.33 They
were comprised of three distinct groups: (1) immigrants landing with an
indenture; (2) "redemptioners"; and (3) transported convicts.34 Transported
convicts obviously lacked the same degree of voluntariness in their passage as
other indentured servants; however, unlike Africans held as slaves, after the
convicts' term was completed, they could choose whether or not to return to
their initial home. Indeed, the British often referred to convicts as "His
Majesty's Seven Years Passengers. '35 Historians tend to discuss them in the
same category as other white indentured servants, a practice this article
follows. The primary differences among the three categories involved how
they entered into the indenture.
The first category of indentured servants included many immigrants from
England, Scotland, and Ireland. They "broadly represent[ed] the English
22, 57-58 (1987).
31. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 205. The Register of Emigrants from 1773-1776
reveals that "more than 4 out of 5 of the emigrants" to Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia were indentured servants. William Miller, The Effects of the American
Revolution on Indentured Servitude, 7 PENN. HIST. 131, 140 (1940).
32. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 209-10; see GALENSON, supra note 24, at 4.
Bailyn offers additional figures for 1770s. In Maryland, the percentage of indentured
servants of immigrants was 97.2 percent. "Less than 9% of the combined migration
to New York and North Carolina were indentured servants. Not a single indentured
servant can be found among those who emigrated ... to New England." BAILYN,
supra note 30, at 208-10.
33. David Souden, English Indentured Servants and the Trans-Atlantic Colonial
Economy, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 19, 28
(Shula Marks & Peter Richardson eds., 1984).
34. See MARCUS W. JERNEGAN, LABORING AND DEPENDENT CLASSES IN
COLONIAL AMERICA, 1607-1783, at 47-48 (reprint ed. 1980) (1931); BALLAGH, supra
note 24, at 66.
35. George R. Mellor, Emigration from the British Isles to the New World, 1765-
1776, 40 HISTORY: J. OF HIST. ASS'N. 68, 71 (1955).
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society of the period" with backgrounds ranging from paupers and unskilled
labor, skilled trades, and even gentry status. Many were "between the ages
of 15 and 25," "predominantly unmarried males," often with deceased or
absentee fathers." They were bound by indentures for a specific length of
time. Indentures could be entered into before the immigrant left the country
of origin. 8  Alternatively, the colonies permitted immigrants who arrived
without indentures to be bound by "custom." The period of "custom" was
rapidly standardized by colonial statutes. For example, a 1715 Maryland
statute provided:
whosoever shall transport any servant into this province without indenture,
such servant being above the age of twenty-two years, shall be obliged to
serve the full time of five years; if between eighteen and twenty-two years,
without indentures, six years; if between fifteen and eighteen, without
indentures, seven years; if under fifteen, without indentures, shall serve till
he or they arrive at the full age of twenty-two years.
Local courts usually determined the age of indentured servants lacking
indentures. Not surprisingly, colonial court records abound with disputes over
ages. Statutes such as that of Maryland avoided overcrowding the court
system by requiring judicial determination only if the master claimed more
than five years service." In general, the contract length appears to have
"stayed constant at a mode of four years for adults."4
The second category, that of "redemptioners," was comprised mostly of
immigrants from Germany or what contemporaries referred to as the
Palatine.4 Redemptioners often traveled in larger family groups, usually
36. Gemery, supra note 18, at 42; Souden, supra note 33, at 26.
37. Farley Grubb, Fatherless and Friendless: Factors Influencing the Flow of
English Emigrant Servants, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 85, 90, 94, 96 (1992); Gemery, supra
note 18, at 40-41.
38. GALENSON, supra note 24, at 15. Under this type of indenture, the importer
bore the risk. If the indenture contract had to be sold for less money than the cost of
passage because of a labor surplus in the colonies, the importer lost money. According
to one author, "the British regulations for the trade required that a legal agreement, or
contract, must be executed for each emigrant before he was taken shipboard."
HERRICK, supra note 30, at 4.
39. An ACT relating to servants and slaves, ch. XLIV (April 1715), 1 LAWS OF
MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p. (William Kilty ed., 1799-1800); see MORRIS, supra note
23, at 312-13. In 1643, Virginia passed its first statute providing statutory periods of
indenture. BALLAGH, supra note 24, at 40.
40. Grubb, supra note 37, at 89; see Gemery, supra note 18, at 36.
41. See WALTER ALLEN KNITTLE, EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PALATINE
EMIGRATION: A BRITISH GOVERNMENT REDEMPTIONER PROJECT TO MANUFACTURE
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destined for Pennsylvania. 2 They migrated without paying the entire
passage fare or signing an indenture. On occasion, they were given time,
often thirty days after arrival, to pay the entire or remaining portion of the
fare. If they could not pay, they were subject to legal action under debtor
laws and sold into servitude by the master of the vessel for whatever period
would cover the passage fare. In practice, however, "captains of most ships
• . . never permitted redemptioners to leave their vessels until they signed
indentures." Indeed, redemptioners often had to pay for relatives who died on
the passage. Redemptioners, like other indentured servants, averaged four
years of service.43
For the third category of immigrants, the cost of passage was irrelevant.
The British government transported English convicts and a few Scottish and
Irish convicts to the colonies. On an informal basis, male and female felons,
paupers, vagrants, and political prisoners had been transported to the colonies
by English merchants since 1661. 44 In 1718, after the colonies attempted to
exclude the importation of "the great numbers of felons and other desperate
villains," Parliament enacted a statute authorizing transportation to the
colonies. 45 Given the opportunity for guaranteed legal profit-the merchants
NAVAL STORES 1-2 (1937). The area included territories along the Rhine River.
Migration from these regions grew out of the end of the Thirty Years War, terrible
climate conditions, religious disagreements, and "land hunger." Id. at 11.
42. Pennsylvania was the destination of choice due to heavy advertising by
William Penn. See id. at 19-20.
43. STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 246; see Gtlnter Moltmann, The Migration of
German Redemptioners to North America, 1720-1820, in COLONIALISM AND
MIGRATION: INDENTURED LABOUR BEFORE AND AFTER SLAVERY 104-22 (P.C.
Emmer ed., 1986); see also GALENSON, supra note 24, at 14-15; HERRICK, supra note
30, at 3-4. The importer faced no risk because, assuming some market for servants,
he was assured full payment. For a description of the redemption system, see Farley
Grubb, The Auction ofRedemptionerServants, Philadelphia, 1771-1804: An Economic
Analysis, 48 ECON. HIST. 583-603 (1988). For a case describing the redemption
process, see Respublica v. Keeper of the Prison of the City and County of
Philadelphia, 2 Yeates 257 (Pa. 1797).
44. See A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF
BRIrISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES, 1718-1775, at 1 (1987); SMITH, supra note 28,
at 89-110; BALLAGH, supra note 24, at 35-36. Convicts received a seven-year sentence
for service; those sentenced to death were transported for fourteen years. See
JERNEGAN, supra note 34, at 48; MORRIS, supra note 23, at 325.
45. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 260-62; An Act for the further preventing
Robbery, Burglary, and other Felonies, and for the more effectual Transportation of
Felons, 4 George II, c. 11 (1717); see also HERRICK, supra note 30, at 118; JERNEGAN,
supra note 34, at 218-49; SMITH, supra note 28, at 104. In 1766, the act was
extended to Scotland. 6 George III, 23 c. (1766). Virginia banned their importation
in 1670 and Maryland followed in 1676. The Virginia legislation concerned 'jaile
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received payment from the British government and the colonial purchaser, and
the colonies were barred from banning the importation-the trade
flourished.4" "Commercial, not penal priorities guided the flow of convicts
.... " "The Chesapeake colonies took in large numbers of felons because it
made economic sense for merchants to send them there."47 Approximately
50,000 convicts were shipped to the colonies between 1718 and 1775. During
the eighteenth century, imported convicts "comprised almost one half of all
indentured servants" in Maryland and "represented as much as a quarter of all
British emigrants to colonial America."4"
Legal regulation of the lives of indentured servants was remarkably similar
despite variations in the time, place, and manner of entry of the indentured
servants.49 Indentured servitude lasted for a period of time established by the
indenture. 0 Regardless of length, the period tended to be inflexible. The
birds." Extracts from the records of the General Court (1670), 2 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 509-10 (William W. Hening ed.,
1809-1823) [hereinafter THE STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA]. The Maryland
statute "was disallowed by home government and for fear of forfeiture of charter was
not reenacted." HERRICK, supra note 30, at 118.
46. See BAILYN, supra note 30, at 262; EKIRCH, supra note 44, at 17-18; SMITH,
supra note 28, at 111-16, 133-35.
47. EKIRCH, supra note 44, at 118-19, 138-40.
48. Id. at 24-25, 27.
49. Detailed studies have been done on indentured servitude in Virginia,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania. For Virginia, see BALLAGH, supra note 24; Warren M.
Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 99 VA.
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45-62 (1991). For Maryland, see EUGENE I.
MCCORMAC, WHITE SERVITUDE IN MARYLAND, 1643-1820 (1904); Russell R. Menard,
From Servant to Freeholder: Status Mobility and Property Accumulation in
Seventeenth-Century Maryland, WILLIAM & MARY Q. 30-64 (3d ser. 1970). For
Pennsylvania, see HERRICK, supra note 30; SALINGER, supra note 30. For New York,
see MCKEE, supra note 30. More general studies including these colonies exists in
MORRIS, supra note 23, and SMITH, supra note 28.
50. By the late 1700s, the length of the period was limited by law. An 1817
Maryland statute provided:
no emigrant shall in any case be bound to serve longer than four years,
unless in case of male minors under the age of seventeen years, and female
minors under the age of fourteen years, who may be obliged to serve any
period so that the males may be free at the age of twenty-one years, and the
females at eighteen.
An act relative to German and Swiss Redemptioners, ch. 226 (February 1818), LAWS
OF MARYLAND [DECEMBER SESSION 1817] 225. In Virginia, the limit was seven
years. An Act concerning servants, ch. LXXXIII (October 1785), 12 THE STATUTES
AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 190-91; see BALLAGH, supra note 24,
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master often could not release a sick indentured servant, permit an indentured
servant to end the term of service early, or contract with the indentured
servant during the first period for a new period of service.5' During the term
of service, indentured servants constituted property: they were assignable
under statutory provisions; they could be sold to satisfy a debt; and they
passed by descent pursuant to testamentary laws.52 As a form of property,
indentured servants were quite restricted in their freedom. They could not
marry, trade with others, or travel without the master's consent.53 If they ran
away, they were brought back and their captors often received a reward for
which the indentured servant had to reimburse the master. Upon return, the
indentured servant usually had the time of service extended as a
punishment.54
at 66-67.
51. Virginia's 1705 "act concerning Slaves and Servants" provided that if a
servant became sick or lame, "the said master or owner shall not put away the said
servant, but shall maintain him or her, during the whole time he or she was before
obliged to serve ...." If the master "upon pretense of freedom" let the servant leave
and the servant became chargeable to the parish, the master would be fined.
Moreover, if sick or disabled servants could not be sold for sufficient value, the
church-wardens of the parish would take care of the servant until the servant's time
had expired; and if the servant could not be sold for sufficient value to cover the cost,
then the master would be liable for the amount. The act also stated that any bargains
by the master with the servant "for further service, or other matter or thing relating to
liberty, or personal profit," would be void unless made in the presence of a court. An
Act concerning Servants and Slaves, ch. XLIX (October 1705), 3 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 449-50. For a general treatment, see
MORRIS, supra note 23, at 309-410; SMITH, supra note 28, at 229-34.
52. See An Act to prevent losses to Executors, ch. VIII (May 1730), 4 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 284; BALLAGH, supra note
24, at 43-44, 66; MORRIS, supra note 23, at 401-14.
53. Towards their servants, masters did have a few duties. For example, a 1705
Virginia act stated that "all masters and owners of servants, shall find and provide for
their servants, wholesome and competent diet, clothing, and lodging." In addition, the
statute barred "immoderate correction," or at least barred it in the absence of an order
from ajustice of the peace. The act also prohibited others from dealing with them and
ministers from performing marriages. An Act concerning Servants and Slaves, ch.
XLIX (October 1705), 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45,
at 447-48. A 1715 Maryland statute prohibited servants traveling "by land or water
ten miles from the house of his, her or their master, mistress or dame, without a note
under their hands .... ." An ACT relating to servants and slaves, ch. XLIV (April
1715), 1 LAWS OF MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p. (William Kilty ed., 1799-1800).
54. See An Act concerning Servants and Slaves, ch. XLIX (October 1705), 3
THE STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 458; MoRRIs, supra
note 23, at 434-61; Billings, supra note 49, at 50.
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Indentured servitude, unlike slavery, existed for only a period of years.
Upon the completion of service, indentured servants in most colonies received
"freedom dues." At first, the colonies often made land grants. In early
Maryland, for example, perhaps as many as ninety percent of indentured
servants received land upon completion of service. 5 Eventually, however,
the colonies turned to either monetary payments or payments in kind by the
master.5 6 Although early seventeenth-century indentured servants had a
degree of economic mobility, by the eighteenth century such mobility had
diminished. For example, according to one study, by 1745 only nine percent
of Pennsylvania indentured servants received land and "about 80 percent...
[were] forced to accept public aid at some point."07
Beyond economics, assimilation into colonial life was often difficult.
Many indentured servants were essential to colonial life. In Maryland, one
Jonathan Boucher claimed that "[a]t least two-thirds of the little education we
receive... are derived from instructors who are either indentured servants or
transported felons."5" As one example from a seventeenth-century Maryland
defamation suit shows, however, escaping the past of indentured servitude was
fraught with difficulties. Elinor Spinkle, a former indentured servant, was
called a "whore"; indeed, "the most impudentest" of those who "were brought
out of Bridewell and Newgate." It was claimed that she had been seen with
55. See MENARD, supra note 49, at 30, 37, 57. Indentured servants in
seventeenth-century Virginia shared similar upward mobility. See BALLAGH, supra
note 24, at 83-87. In seventeenth-century Pennsylvania, about one-third received land,
albeit a number received only subsistence quantities. SALINGER, supra note 30, at 45.
For a study of seventeenth-century servant mobility in South Carolina that suggests
similar conclusions of upward mobility, see AARON M. SHATzMAN, SERVANTS INTO
PLANTERS: THE ORIGIN OF AN AMERICAN IMAGE: LAND ACQUISITION AND STATUS
MOBILITY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH CAROLINA (1989).
56. In 1715, Maryland required:
every man servant shall, at such time of expiration of his servitude as
aforesaid, have allowed and given him one new hat, a good suit; that is to
say, coat and breeches, either of kersey or broad cloth, one new shirt of
white linen, one new pair of French fall shoes, and stockings, two hoes and
one axe, and one gun of twenty shillings price ....
Women servants received petticoats, aprons, caps, and, instead of a gun, "three barrels
of Indian com." For servants who did not receive their freedom dues or were subject
to ill treatment, the statutes assured judicial redress. However, most statutes also
provided penalties for frivolous suits. An ACT relating to Servants and Slaves, ch.
XLIV (April 1715) 1 LAWS OF MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p. (William Kilty ed., 1799-
1800); see An Act concerning Servants and Slaves, ch. XLIX (October 1705), 3 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 448-51; MORRIS, supra note
23, at 393-99, 470-510; SMITH, supra note 28, at 238-41.
57. SALINGER, supra note 30, at 132.
58. JERNEGAN, supra note 34, at 53.
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"her Coates up to her middle & that Rogue Tom Hughes with his breeches
down." Her husband did not dispute that she was an imported convict. He
argued, however, that she had "been almost five years in this Country without
the least blemish of Immodesty ... and that her education & former life in
England being known to divers in this Country to be none other than honest,
modest & Civil."59
Over time, awareness of indentured servitude decreased as the institution
came to play less of a role in transatlantic passages. Bernard Bailyn writes,
"by the time of the American Revolution the indenture system had ceased to
be quantitatively important in any part of British America." 6' For those
entering the nation, however, indentured servitude was still a viable means of
transport. On the eve of the Revolution, the English Register of Emigrants,
1773-1776 reveals that "more than 4 out of 5 of the emigrants" to Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia were indentured servants." Another author
calculates, the "overall incidence of servitude among British subjects arriving
in Philadelphia in 1773 was 29 percent and among Germans arriving between
1785 and 1804 was 45%. '"62 A conservative estimate provides that
"indentured servants comprised about 38% of those immigrating to the
mainland colonies in the early 1770s., 63 Even the American Revolution did
not end the institution of indentured servitude. Although the general decline
in immigration because of European and American conflicts disrupted the
importation of indentured servitude, the indentured servitude trade began again
after 1815. In 1819, however, it suddenly declined.' By the mid-1830s,
Robert Steinfeld asserts, no "European indented servants remained in the
United States."
6
Reasons for the disappearance of indentured servitude abound. The
combination of a series of economic depressions, interruptions of transatlantic
shipping, and a cultural discomfort about white bound labor seems the most
persuasive explanation.66  And one should not overemphasize the
consequences of the disappearance of indentured servitude. As Christopher
59. PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND:
JANUARY 1637/8-SEPTEMBER 1664, ARCHIVEs OF MARYLAND 516-17 (William Hand
Browne ed., 1883).
60. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 208-10.
61. Miller, supra note 31, at 140.
62. Grubb, supra note 28, at 337.
63. Id. at 317 n.2.
64. STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 11. He notes that as late as 1785-1804, forty-
five percent of German immigrants in Philadelphia were redemptioners.
65. STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 11.
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Tomlins suggests, for many so-called "free" workers, their own labor power
remained in reality a property right, a commodity in the employment
relationship that they did not control. 7 Nonetheless, the erasure of white
bound labor permitted the growth of a cultural dichotomy between "free labor"
and a race-based slavery."
III. INDENTURED SERVANTS ARE ARTICLES OF COMMERCE
Indentured servitude was both a labor relationship and a way of moving
people from Great Britain and Europe to British North America. Indentured
servants were simultaneously individuals who increased population and a pool
of bound labor. They were considered a commodity; their movement was part
of a transatlantic commerce. This part begins by examining statutory language
and historical accounts to show that the transportation of indentured servants
was generally perceived as a commerce of "imported" persons. The second
section demonstrates that the legislation that regulated this transport by
encouraging or discouraging the entry of imported indentured servants
employed measures that were typically used to regulate commerce. The last
section argues that even as the late eighteenth-century turned to protect
"passengers," the legislation continued to betray the perception that the
passengers were imported articles of commerce.
A. Transportation of Indentured Servants as a Commerce
1. The Cultural Perception of the Commerce
To the merchants involved, the transportation of people was a trade, and
a most profitable one. Many importers of ordinary indentured servants were
"regular agencies"; others transported on consignment or single ventures.
Henry Gemery notes that "an active set of agents and masters... recruited,
indentured, transported, and sold servants overseas."69 The trade provided
a full ship for every voyage as indentured servants could fill up space not
already filled by material goods. As one South Carolina importer wrote in
1755: "The Palatine Trade to America being stopped will deprive us of many
Ships that Constantly resorted there & have been the Chief means for Years
past of keeping down our Freights. 70 For others, it was the convict trade
67. See TOMLINS, supra note 23, at 260-61.
68. See STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 121-46.
69. Gemery, supra note 18, at 48.
70. LETTER BOOKS OF HENRY LAURENS, MERCHANT (1746-1783), at 116, quoted
in WARREN B. SMITH, WHITE SERvITUDE IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA 53 (1961);
see James Hamilton Alexander, White Indentured Servitude: An American Economic
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that promised the greatest profit. One merchant wrote to his partner that
"'their business if properly managed will in a few years make Us very genteel
fortunes. The Sales of the Convicts run up amazingly in a little time."' 7
Nonmerchants saw the trade as an investment opportunity-"the degree of
small scale participation is striking."72 As Bernard Bailyn points out, by the
1770s,
so many merchants took an occasional small 'adventure' transporting a few
indentured servants, and so many commercial vessels accommodated a few
free workers as paying passengers that the commerce in the transfer of labor
fades indistinguishably into commerce and shipping in general.'
For England's commercial culture, indentured servants were just one more
profitable article of commerce.
Some contemporary observers who recognized that indentured servants
were articles of commerce, imported for sale, spoke from experience. James
Revel described in poetic form his transport as an indentured servant in the
late seventeenth century:
Our faces shav'd, comb' out our wigs and hair,
That we in decent order might appear,
Against the planters did come down to view,
How well they lik'd this fresh transported crew.
The Women separated from us stand,
As well as we, by them for to be view's;
And in short time some men up to us came,
Some ask'd our trades, and others ask'd our names.
Some view'd our limbs, and other's tum'd us round
Examening like Horses, if we're sound,
What trade are you, my Lad, says one to me,
A Tin-man, Sir, that will not do, says he[.]
Experience 77-84 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Houston);
Farley Grubb, Redemptioner Immigration to Pennsylvania: Evidence on Contract
Choice and Profitability, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 407-18 (1986).
71. Letter from William Stevenson to James Cheston, December 30, 1769,
quoted in EKIRCH, supra note 44, at 77, 70-86. "As late as 1765, one Philadelphia
merchant was remarking that 'the chief articles that answer here from Ireland which
can be bought are Linnens . . . Beef, Butter, Men, Women & Boy Servants."'
STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 89.
72. Gemery, supra note 18, at 47; see Souden, supra note 33, at 29.
73. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 297. Bailyn describes in detail the commercial
aspects of the trade. Id. at 271-352. "Large shiploads of indentured servants" may
have produced "net profits" of £650 to £700. Id. at 344.
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Some felt our hands and view'd our legs and feet,
And made us walk, to see we were compleat;
Some view'd our teeth, to see if they were good,
Or fit to chew our hard and homely Food.
If any like our look, our limbs, our trade,
The Captain then a good advantage made;
For they a difference made it did appear.
Twixt those for seven and for fourteen year.
Another difference there is alow'd,
They who have money have most favour show'd;
For if no cloaths nor money they have got,
Hard is their fate, and hard will be their lot.
At length a grim old Man unto me came,
He ask'd my trade, and likewise ask'd my name;
I told him I a Tin-man was by trade,
And not quite eighteen years of age I said.
Likewise the cause I told that brought me there,
That I for fourteen years transported were,
And when he this from me did understand,
He bought me of the Captain out of hand.74
Almost a century later, little had changed. John Harrower who kept a diary
of his experience as an indentured servant noted:
Munday 16th May 1774
This day severalls came on board to purchase serv[an]ts. Indentures
and among them there was two Soul drivers. They are men who make it
their [business] to go on board all ships who have in either Servants or
Convicts and buy sometimes the whole and sometimes a [parcel] of them
as they can agree, and then they drive them through the Country like a
[parcel] of Sheep [until] they can sell them to advantage, but all went away
without buying any.75
Other observers spoke out of concern over the sale of white English and Irish
servants. A letter reprinted in a New York paper in 1775 stated:
74. James Revel, The Poor Unhappy Transported Felon's Sorrowful Account of
his Fourteen Years Transportation at Virginia in America, in THE OLD DOMINION IN
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 1606-1689,
at 137-39 (Warren M. Billings ed., 1975). Almost the same poem is discussed as
written by a James Lawson in JOHN VAN DER ZEE, BOUND OVER: INDENTURED
SERVITUDE AND AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 69-80 (1985).
75. THE JOURNAL OF JOHN HARROWER, AN INDENTURED SERVANT IN THE
COLONY OF VIRGINIA, 1773-1776, at 39-40 (Edward Miles Riley ed., 1963).
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Every year certain merchants and owners of vessels in Great Britain and
Ireland send over loads of mechanics and labouring people of both sexes,
whom by art and falsehood, they persuade to indent themselves for 4 or 5
years for their passage, and when they get them here sell them for slaves
at public sale, or barter them for country produce.76
The surveyor of customs at Annapolis noted that if "the particulars of this
iniquitous traffic [were] universally divulged, those who have established
offices in London . . .for the regular conduct of this business would be
pointed out to obloquy."" On the other side of the Atlantic, George
Gardyner worried about the outflow of men to the colonies: "'Tis
dishonourable, in that we are upbraided by all other Nations that know that
trade for selling our own Countrymen for the Commodities of those
places. 7 8
The statutes written by colonial legislatures reflected this perception that
immigrants were articles of commerce. In regions with a substantial trade in
indentured servants-the Chesapeake and the South7 9-statutes often referred
to the indentured servants as commodities or discussed their regulation
alongside the regulation of other commodities. For example, Virginia statutes
in the 1630s and 1640s stated that the master of the ship must present a list
of persons brought on the ship "for the prevention of forestallinge the markett
and ingrossinge of commodities. '"8  A 1642 statute forbade the sale of
"goods or servants" by the shipmaster before arriving at James City port.8'
In 1695, a Jamaica statute discussed the importation of both wine and
people. 2 A similar grouping can be found in a 1718 Maryland statute that
76. ETHERiNGTON'S NEW YORK CHRONICLE, Jan. 27, 1775, quoted in Mellor,
supra note 35, at 70.
77. Mellor, supra note 35, at 70 (quoting WILLIAM EDDIS, LETTERS FROM
AMERICA ... COMPRISING OCCURRENCES FROM 1769 TO 1777, at 76 (1792)).
78. Souden, supra note 33, at 19,23 (quoting G. GARDYNER, A DESCRIPTION OF
THE NEW WORLD, OR, AMERICA ISLANDS AND CONTINENT 8 (London 1651)).
79. In these regions, statutes relating to immigrants were statutes relating to
indentured servants. Regions are discussed in which some statutes appear addressing
immigrants who were not indentured servants in part III.A.2.
80. Act XXVIII (February 1631-1632) 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 166; see Act XXIII (September 1632), id. at 190-92.
81. Act VII (March 1642-1643), id. at 244-46.
82. An Act to Reimburse their Majesties Treasury, and Encourage Their Subjects
to Come and Settle in this Island, THE CONTINUATION OF THE LAWS OF JAMAICA
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used the language of importation to refer together to "Several Sorts of
Liquors," "Negroes," "Irish Servants," and "Irish Papists." 3
Even more typical was the extension of the language of commerce
-"imported" and "importers"-to indentured servants and their transport to
the colonies. In 1642-1643, a Virginia statute set the time of service for
"servants as shall be imported haveing [sic] no indentures."84 In 1699, a poll
was laid on "servants and slaves imported" into the province with the sum to
be paid by "the importer."8 5 By 1727, Maryland statutes linked "servants"
to the phrase "imported into this province." 6  A 1729 Pennsylvania act
concluded that an earlier act for "preventing the importation of persons
convicted of heinous crimes," needed to be strengthened to "discourage the
great importation and coming in of numbers of foreigners and of lewd, idle
and ill-affected persons." To this end, "all masters of vessels, merchants or
others who shall import or bring . . . any Irish servant or passenger upon
83. An Act laying an Imposition on Negroes, and on Several Sorts of Liquors
imported, and also on Irish Servants, to prevent the Importing two [sic] great a
Number of Irish Papists into this Province, THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF
MARYLAND 166-69 (reprint ed. 1978) (1718).
84. Act XXVI (March 1642-1643), 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE . . . OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 257.
85. An act for laying an imposition upon servants and slaves imported into this
country, towards building the Capitoll [sic], act XII (April 1699), 3 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 193-95. For other examples, see An act
continuing the acts laying impositions .... Act V (August 1701), id. at 212-13; An act
for raising a publick revenue... (October 1705), id. at 346-48; An Act concerning
Servants and Slaves, ch. XLIX (October 1705), id. at 447-49; An act for raising a
Public Revenue, ch. V (October 1710), id. 490, 492-93; An Act concerning Servants,
and Slaves, ch. XIV (October 1748), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA,
supra note 45, at 547-48.
The acts of 1650s and 1660s alternated between using "imported" and "coming
in." See Servants how long to serve, Act XCVIII (March 1661-1662), 2 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE . . . OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 113; Servants bringing in
goods .. ., Act II (December 1662), id. at 164-65.
86. An Act directing the payment of fees arising due on the prosecution of white
servants which shall hereafter be imported into this province, ch. II (October 1727),
1 LAWS OF MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p. (William Kilty ed., 1799-1800). Maryland
statutes in 1728 and 1750 also referred to "imported" servants. See An ACT... to
explain an act, entitled, An act for laying an additional duty of twenty shillings.., on
all Irish servants being papists, to prevent the growth of popery by the importation of
too great a number of them into this province. . ., ch. VIII (October 1728), id. at
n.p.; An ACT to remedy some evils relating to servants, ch. V (May 1750), id. at n.p.
The 1715 Maryland Act concerning indentured servants referred to "all servants
transported into this province" and to "servants imported into this province." An ACT
relating to servants and slaves, ch. XLIV .(April 1715), id. at n.p.
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redemption" had to pay twenty shillings for each indentured servant.87 New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina also all referred to
indentured servants as "imported."'88 The "imported" language in many
colonies continued to appear into the 1750S.89
2. An Alternative Cultural Perception
In New England and New York, some colonial statutes referred to
immigrants, not as "imported" indentured servants, but as "chargeable"
paupers. Statutes from these two regions suggest that in areas where
indentured servitude was less prevalent, an alternative cultural perception
arose-immigrants might not be articles of commerce. However, the small
number of immigrants to these regions and the continual desire for indentured
servants in these regions ensured that the vision of immigrants as imported
articles of commerce continued relatively undisturbed.
In New England, statutes referring to immigration did not always use the
"imported" language and often expressed a desire for removing immigrants.
For example, in 1638, New Plymouth required the "Master of a Boate" to
"recarry" any passengers who did not have leave of the Governor." A 1642
87. An Act Laying a Duty on Foreigners and Irish Servants Imported into this
Province, ch. CCCVII (May 1729), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 135-40 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1896-1911)
[hereinafter THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801]. For other
early Pennsylvania examples, see An Act Imposing a Duty on Persons Convicted of
Heinous Crimes and to Prevent Poor and Impotent Persons being Imported into the
Province of Pennsylvania, ch. CCCXIV (February 1729-1730), id. at 164-71; An Act
Imposing a Duty on Persons Convicted of Heinous Crimes Brought into this Province
and not Warranted by the Laws of Great Britain, and to Prevent Poor and Impotent
Persons being Imported into the same, ch. CCCLIV (February 1742-1743), id. at 360-
70; An Act for Prohibiting the Importation of Germans or Other Passengers in too
Great Numbers in any One Vessel, ch. CCCLXXXI (January 1749-1750), 5 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra, at 94-96.
88. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating of White Servants (1714), THE EARLIEST
PRINTED LAWS OF NEW JERSEY 1703-1772, at 24-26 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978); An
Act imposing a Duty on Persons convicted of heinous Crimes, and to prevent poor and
impotent Persons being imported" (n.d.), THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF
DELAWARE, 1704-1741, at 138-44 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978). For North Carolina,
THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1669-1751 (John D. Cushing
ed., 1978). For South Carolina, see An Act for the Encouragement of the Importation
of White Servants (1698), 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 153
(1837).
89. See supra notes 85, 86, 87.
90. THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW
PLYMOUTH 62 (reprint ed. 1986) (1836) [hereinafter THE COMPACT ... OF NEW
[Vol. 61
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law required inhabitants who "brought over" people who were "apparently
likely to be chargeable," and who were objected to, to "discharge the Towne
of them."'" The 1671 law extended this provision so that the "master of any
Vessel" had to carry away or provide security for any person identified as
chargeable.92
These statutes appeared to focus less on the commerce aspect of
immigration than on the financial status of the immigrant. This concern with
financial status arose because of the underlying system of poor laws in New
England.93 Colonial poor laws, modeled on English laws, required towns to
care for impoverished or sick members. Towns consequently were loathe to
accept "strangers" who appeared likely to become charges.94 This reluctance
arose without regard to whether the "stranger" came from another town or
another continent.
Immigrants fell within this alternative cultural perception because of the
weakness of the indentured servitude trade in New England. The ethnic and
religious structure of New England and the lack of large-scale, labor-intensive
agricultural enterprises prevented the indentured servant trade from becoming
a dominant labor supply.95 The general absence of indentured servants,
particularly female servants, appears in a 1649 letter to the son of the former
Governor of Massachusetts, John Winthrop, Jr. The sender explained that he
had sent to Winthrop, one Catherine Lemon, a spinster, as an indentured
servant. He added, "though you haue maides inough for praesent yet did not
know but some of them might be quickly out of theire times and maids are
scarce to come by."96 As Timothy Breen notes, "The New England colonies
were such notoriously bad markets for indentured servants that something
under 2% of the individuals" on two lists of indentured servants "bothered to
PLYMOUTH].
91. Id. at 72.
92. Id at 273.
93. Concern over immigrants also arose because of politics or religion. See
EMBERSON EDWARD PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: A STUDY OF THE
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 9-10, 17-20
(1900).
94. See ROBERT W. KELSO, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1920, at 30-42, 45-55 (reprint ed. 1969) (1922); Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of America Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L. REV.
175, 201-14 (1955).
95. See Clifford K. Shipton, Immigration to New England, 1680-1740, 44 J.
POL. ECON. 225, 232-39 (1936).
96. 5 WINTHROP PAPERS 339, 350-51 (1947). The Pilgrims were, in many
respects, indentured servants promising to work for seven years in return for English
investors paying their passage.
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go there."97 But the low figure of indentured servants was representative of
generally low figures of immigrants to colonial New England. So few
immigrants came to New England after the 1630s and 1640s9" that
population models for seventeenth century New England assuming a
population "closed to migration" have been considered "close" to accurate.99
New England was not happy about the absence of indentured servants.
In 1701, Boston "urged the General Court to promote the importation of white
servants" to "fight Indians and eventually become free to plant new towns and
raise up families."'" In 1708, a law "to Encourage the Importation of
White Servants" offered forty shillings a head to each master of a vessel or
merchant who imported male servants between eight and twenty-four years of
age.'' Moreover, the poor laws actually sought to guarantee investment in
immigrant indentured servants. A 1642 Massachusetts statute stated that if an
inhabitant "shall bring over a servant from England or els where [sic]...
which by Gods Providence shall fall diseased lame or impotent by the way or
after they come here," the town would maintain the servant after the term of
service expired. 2 Similarly, in eighteenth-century Boston, under the poor
laws, "immigrants were allowed to remain if they were able-bodied tradesmen,
indentured servants, or the possessors of £50." 1°3 The poor laws weeded out
only those immigrants who were judged incapable of any productive activity
97. Breen, supra note 22, at 190 n.2.
98. The substantial immigration during these years is referred to as the "Great
Migration." Breen suggests that over the twelve-year period at least 15,000 English
ventured to New England. See id. at 222.
99. MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 26, at 216; see Shipton, supra note 95,
at 225.
100. Shipton, supra note 95, at 229.
101. An Act to Encourage the Importation of White Servants (1708-9), 1 THE
ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
MASSACHUSETrS BAY 634 (Boston ed. 1869) [hereinafter ACTS AND RESOLVES].
Those bringing in "Indian slaves" and "negro's" had to pay a duty.
102. THE COMPACT... OF NEw PLYMOUTH, supra note 90, at 72. The 1671
statute was similar but applied only if the "covenant servant" was "sound and well."
Id. at 273. Massachusetts laws on the admission of town inhabitants in 1700 had a
similar structure except required a list of passengers to be sent to the towns. An Act
directing the Admission of Town Inhabitants (1700-1), 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra
note 101, at 451-53, Early statutes also required masters to give servants land out of
their own property. See "Lands to Servants" (1636), THE COMPACT... OF NEw
PLYMOUTH, supra note 90, at 47; see also id. at 36, 58, 65; "Strangers, Sojourner, and
Servants" (1656) and "Masters, Servants, Sojourners" (1672), THE EARLIEST LAWS OF
THE NEw HAVEN AND CONNECTICUT COLONIES 1639-1673, at 52, 121-22 (John D.
Cushing ed., 1977).
103. Shipton, supra note 95, at 239.
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by colonial standards.' °4 Despite these efforts to support the trade, and
although a general increase occurred in the importation of English and Irish
indentured servants in the early eighteenth century, the trade never became
well-established in New England.105
The alternative cultural perception of immigrants as potential paupers that
appeared in the poor laws did not alter the dominant cultural perception that
immigrants were articles of commerce. The possibility of the poor laws'
application to immigrants arose because indentured servitude turned potential
immigrant paupers into a labor force and, where indentured servitude was
weak, immigrant paupers might remain paupers. In reality, the poor laws
probably only applied to the few immigrants who were unable even to
indenture themselves. Despite the small numbers of immigrants and
indentured servants, the statutes recognized the existence of the commerce in
indentured servants and admitted, perhaps even favored, the possibility that
immigrants could be articles of commerce.
New York reinforces the theory that the existence of statutes defining
immigrants in ways other than "imported" did not displace the general cultural
perception that immigrants were articles of commerce. New York-bounded
on one side by New England's lack of large demand for indentured servants
and on the other by the Chesapeake and Virginia's participation in it-passed
statutes that represented incoming persons as potential paupers but also those
that referred to immigrants as "imported." The colony wanted indentured
servants. In 1712, 1757, and 1766 New York passed statutes using "imported"
designed to encourage the importation of indentured servants-but to no
avail.0 6
New York, indeed, like New England, experienced little early transatlantic
immigration. Contemporary comments from the late seventeenth century
recount few settlers arriving in New York. 7 Statutes that used language
other than that of "importation," appear to have referred to a fear over
intercolonial migration. For example, a 1721 act "to prevent Vagrant and Idle
Persons from being a Charge" referred to persons "transported" and persons
104. See An Act in addition to the Act directing the Admission of Town
Inhabitants .. ., ch. 5 (1722-23), 2 AcTS AND RESOLVES, supra note 101, at 244-45
(1874).
105. Shipton, supra note 95, at 232. For a discussion of importation into
Massachusetts, see Towner, supra note 30.
106. See MCKEE, supra note 30. See part B for discussion.
107. The population relied on its Dutch original settlers and indentured servants
and later friends of the Duke of York. See MARCUS LEE HANSEN, THE ATLANTIC
MIGRATION, 1607-1830, at 36, 38, 39 (1940); MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION 12-14 (2d ed. 1992); Ernst van den Boogaart, The Servant Migration to
New Netherland, 1624-1664, in COLONIALISM AND MIGRATION: INDENTURED LABOUR
BEFORE AND AFTER SLAVERY 55-75 (P.C. Emmer ed., 1986).
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"imported" when requiring shipmasters to return people likely to be a burden
or post bond." 8 The people who were referred to as "transported" appeared
to be fleeing the Caribbean and other colonies.
WHEREAS Several Idle and Necessitous Persons come or are brought into
this Province from the Neighbouring Colonys & Plantations, or Some of his
Majesties Plantations, who have either Fled from thence for fear of
punishment for their Crimes, or being Slothful and unwilling to Work, have
Contracted Debts, and to avoid the payment of them, Transported
themselves into this Province, Verry often to the great Damage of the
Persons so Transporting them, as well as charge & Trouble to the Places,
into Which they come, or are brought, by reason of their lurking Privately
in Cities, or in Places in the Counties remote from the habitations of
Justices of the peace."°
108. An Act to prevent Vagrant and Idle Persons from being a Charge and
Expence to any [of] the Counties, Cities[,] Towns, Manners or Precincts within this
Province, ch. 410 (July 1721), 2 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE
YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 56-61 (1896) [hereinafter THE COLONIAL LAws OF
NEW YORK]. The act was similar to a 1683 version aimed at "the prevention and
discourageing of Vagabonds and Idle persons to come into this province from other
parts, and also from one part of the Province to another." An Act for the Defraying
of the publique & necessary Charge of each respective City, towne and County
throughout this Province & for maintaining the poore, & preventing vagabonds, ch. 9
(November 1683), 1 THE COLONIAL LAws OF NEW YORK, supra, at 131-32.
109. An Act to prevent Vagrant and Idle Persons from being a Charge and
Expence to any [of] the Counties, Cities[,] Towns, Manners or Precincts within this
Province, ch. 410 (July 1721), 2 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 108,
at 57. This act, like the poor laws in New England, required the shipmaster to provide
lists of passengers and security for persons unqualified to remain. Similar acts in 1683
and 1691 required masters of vessels to present within twenty-four hours "a list of all
such passengers hee [sic] brings into this Province with their Qualityes & Conditions."
If "any vessell bring in any person not qualified as aforesaid, nor able to give security
for their well demeanor," the shipmaster had to transport them out of the province.
An Act for the Defraying of the publique & necessary Charge, supra note 108, at 133;
An Act for the defraying of the Publique & necessary charge throughout this Province
and maintaining the poor and preventing Vagabonds, ch. 6 (May 1691), id. at 237.
The 1691 act was repealed in 1701 "[e]xcept so much thereof as relates to Vagabonds."
An Act for Repealing an Act.. ., ch. 96 (October 1701), id. at 456-58. Despite the
shipmaster's remedies, the shipmaster was forced to put up fifty pounds of security or
to transport the person back. The 1683 act noted that, after "the Custome & practice
of his Majestys Realm of England," any person who came had to have "a Visible
Estate" or a "manuall craft or occupacon [sic]." If not, before being admitted, the
"Inhabitant [must] give sufficient Security thatt hee shall nott bee a burthen or charge
[sic]." Under the 1721 act, if a stowaway did not have a license or could not provide
two thousand pounds as security and pay the shipmaster any damages or costs, then
[Vol. 61
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As the Act noted, "persons deeply In-debted in the said Islands and
Plantations, find means privately to be Conveyed on board in Casks or Chests
without the knowledge of the Master of Such Vessell." These people were not
within the standard flow of immigrant commerce. As individuals, they had
slipped aboard the ship.
Moreover, in reality, few poor immigrants appear to have entered colonial
New York."' In fact, one recorded instance of poor immigrants flooding
New York actually was an example of indentured servitude. In 1710, the
British government agreed to transport 2800 refugees, originally from the
Palatine, out of England where they were living in encampments on the
outskirts of London. Most of the passengers were sent as indentured servants
of the British government to manufacture naval stores in New York."'
Although statutes in northern regions referred to immigrants in ways that
seem to suggest that incoming persons were not always seen as articles of
commerce, these regions receihed comparatively few immigrants-and even
fewer indentured servants-prior to the American Revolution. Moreover, even
in these regions, local legislatures attempted to encourage importation. The
very existence in these areas of statutes referring to persons as "imported,"
establishes the breadth of the cultural perception that most immigrants were
articles of commerce.
B. Entry Regulated as Commerce
If most immigrants were indentured servants, and indentured servants were
articles of commerce, then their entry into British North America was to be
regulated as a commerce. And, as with any commerce, the colonies tried to
the stowaway would be kept in custody and returned to the island or plantation. The
act authorized shipmasters to seize such persons.
110. RAYMOND A. MOHL, POVERTY IN NEW YoRK: 1783-1825, at42 (1971).
111. ROBERT E. CRAY JR., PAUPERS AND POOR RELIEF IN NEw YORK CITY AND
ITS RURAL ENvIRONS, 1700-1830 (1988); KNrrTLE, supra note 41, at 131. For a full
account of the British government project, see id. at 111-224. New York forced those
who survived the voyage to land, not in Manhattan, but at Governor's Island. Id at
148. The indentured servitude system transformed the poor into useful labor as even
the children were quickly indentured. The numbers of poor immigrants entering New
York without being indentured servants appears to have been quite small. Prior to the
mid-eighteenth century, statistics suggest that New York's poor were few. In 1700,
the list of permanent poor in a city of 5,000 amounted to 35. In 1735, with a
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control importation. Consistent with the belief that immigration involved a
commerce, regulation did not focus on the people entering, but on the
merchants who imported them. For the most part, the laws encouraged and
discouraged importers, not individual immigrants.
1. Encouraging Importation
Many colonies, at some point in the colonial period, attempted to
encourage the importation of indentured servants by paying the importers. In
the early seventeenth century, a number of colonies gave land to the importer.
For example, in Virginia, a "headright" of fifty acres was offered to those who
would import people." 2 Money gradually replaced land. In New England
where the trade in indentured servants never seemed to catch on,
Massachusetts in 1708-1709 offered forty shillings for each white male
indentured servant "import[ed].""' 3 Several years later, South Carolina
agreed to pay twenty-five pounds for every indentured servant and twenty-two
pounds for boys between twelve and sixteen. The colony's stated rationale
was to increase the white population to defend against "Indian enemies" and
to mitigate the increase in "slaves.""' 4  Between 1696 and 1741, South
Carolina passed ten similar statutes attempting to encourage settlement. s
New York sought to encourage importation by making certain laws that
would support the trade. In 1712 and 1757, New York's governor tried
unsuccessfully to have legislation passed encouraging the importation of white
servants. Finally, in 1766, New York passed a law that openly proclaimed the
colony's desire for poor protestant immigrants. The preamble stated,
"WHEREAS the Emigration of Protestants from Europe hath conduced greatly
to the Settlement of this Colony, and doubts have arisen tending to the
discouragementof further Importations of poor Persons." The act's provisions
ensured that importing indentured servants would give the importer a legal
profit. The statute affirmed that contracts for service would bind an infant or
adult, that indentured servants were assignable, and that children could be





112. Act LVII (March 1642-1643), 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE . . . OF
ViRGINIA, supra note 45, at 274. For a general discussion of the headright system in
the different colonies, see HANSEN, supra note 107, at 29-31, 37-38, 40-44.
113. An Act to Encourage the Importation of White Servants, ch. II (February
1708-1709), 1 AcTs AND RESOLVES, supra note 101, at 634.
114. AN ACT to encourage the importation of white Servants into this Province
(1716), 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 646-49 (1837).
115. See PROPER, supra note 93, at 69.
116. An Act for the Regulation of Servants, ch. 1306 (December 1766), 4 THE
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One of the most unusual statutes is from Jamaica. The Jamaican
government in 1695 decided to encourage settlement. For British and
European immigrants-excepting "Jews, Cripples, and children under
Eleven"- the act promised that the government would pay ship captains for
the person's passage. The person would be "Free from a manner of
Servitude." To accomplish this end, the act required masters to present a list
of passengers. Despite the result of freeing the incipient indentured servant,
the act nonetheless was aimed at the importer. The shipmaster received
money for "personal use" depending on the passenger's origin: more for the
passengers of Scottish, English, and European origin; one pound less for those
from Ireland."
7
The colonies encouraged the immigration of white Europeans and British
for a variety of reasons-often to provide labor or alter regional racial
composition. But regardless of motivation, the colonies' efforts were aimed,
not at the immigrant, but at the importing shipmaster. With a commerce, the
best encouragement was to ensure that there would be money to be made in
the importing venture.
2. Discouraging Importation
If, at times, the colonies tried to encourage importation, at other times,
they sought to discourage the importation of certain categories of indentured
servants based on ethnicity, religion, age, health, and past behavior. Revealing
once again the perception that the importation was a commerce, these acts did
not bar the individuals from entering. Instead, they tried to make the trade in
these categories of people less profitable. Duties were one popular device.
Irish indentured servants were the subjects of many such duties. For
example, Virginia chose in 1699 to help build a capitol by a fifteen shilling
duty on "every servant not born in England or Wales.""' 8 Maryland passed
COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 108, at 924; see MCKEE, supra note 30,
at 94.
117. An Act to Encourage Their Subjects, THE CONTINUATION OF THE LAWS OF
JAMAICA PASSED BY THE ASSEMBLY... 1695, at 45-46 (London: Printed for Charles
Harper, 1698).
118. An act for laying an imposition upon servants and slaves imported into this
country, towards building the Capitoll [sic], Act XII (April 1699), 3 THE STATUTES
AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 193. The laws may not have been
designed to completely bar Irish Catholics. The Virginia law suggests that, at times,
the laws placing duties upon Irish servants may have been less concerned with the
spread of popery than with the desire to raise money and the fear that the English
would not tolerate duties on English servants. For example, Virginia's policy towards
the Irish frequently changed. In 1657, it required Irish servants without indentures to
serve six years, a period longer than white protestant indentured servants. However,
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acts that placed "an additional duty of twenty shillings" on "all Irish servants
being papists, to prevent the growth of popery by the importation of too great
a number of them.""' 9 In 1729, a Pennsylvania act required:
all masters or vessels, merchants or others who shall import or bring into
any port or place within this province any Irish servant or passenger upon
redemption, or on condition of paying for his or her passage upon or after
their arrival in the plantations, shall pay for every such Irish servant or
passenger upon redemption as aforesaid the sum of twenty shillings.
Indeed, to stop "masters of vessels, merchants and others trading into this
province" from avoiding paying duties by landing the Irish in "adjacent
governments," the act authorized any Irish indentured servants found within
a year of their importation to be questioned as to how they had entered the
province. The offending merchant then was compelled to pay twenty pounds
per person.'
The importation of convicts brought similar duties to be paid by the
shipmasters. The British government prohibited such duties.' The
within three years of passage, Virginia repealed the law because it appeared to
"discourage[]" them "from comeing into the country, And by that meanes the peopling
of the country retarded." An Act for repealing an Act for Irish Servants, Act XIV
(March 1659-1660), id. at 538-39.
119. An ACT to supply some defects in the act, entitled ... , ch. VIII (October
1728), 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p. (William Kilty ed., 1799-1800)
(referring to a similar 1717 act).
120. An Act Laying a Duty on Foreigners and Irish Servants Imported into this
Province, ch. CCCVII (May 1729), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
1682-1801, supra note 87, at 135-40; see An Act Imposing a Duty on Persons
Convicted of Heinous Crimes and to Prevent Poor and Impotent Persons being
Imported into the Province of Pennsylvania, ch. CCCXIV (February 1729-1730), id.
at 164-71; An Act to prevent Vagrant and Idle Persons from being a Charge and
Expence to any [of] the Counties, Cities L] Towns, Manners or Precincts within this
Province, ch. 410 (July 1721), 2 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEw YORK, supra note 108,
at 61.
121. When the convict trade was conducted by the British on an informal basis,
Virginia and Maryland passed legislation banning convict importation. For
Pennsylvania's 1683 proposal, see HERRICK, supra note 30, at 121. For Maryland's
1676 act, see id. at 118. For Virginia's 1671 attempt, see 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE
...OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45, at 509; MORGAN, supra note 25, at 236. See
generally PROPER, supra note 93, at 61, 65. With the passage of the British 1718
transportation act, the colonists could no longer bar the trade. An act for the further
preventing robbery, burglary, and other felons, and for the more effectual
transportation of felons. . ., 4 George I, ch. 11 (1718). The colonies continued
undeterred, however, to pass legislation relating to convicts.
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colonies, however, manipulated the technicalities of Privy Council review to
keep the legislation in force. Laws were sent to England for review at the last
possible moment and only after passing new legislation. For example, in
Pennsylvania, delays, amendments, and ancient unrepealed laws kept the
convict measures in force.' The status of convict laws became sufficiently
122. Pennsylvania's numerous acts imposing duties and bonds on convicts
provide a typical example. When the British government began to advise repeal, the
colony took refuge in the rule that laws considered by and not acted on by the Privy
Council within six months of arrival were valid. Pennsylvania delayed sending such
laws to England until the last possible moment and then only after passing new
regulations.
In 1721-1722, Pennsylvania passed an actrequiring a five-pound duty per convict
before landing and a fifty-pound bond posted to ensure security. An Act for Imposing
a Duty on Persons Convicted of Heinous Crimes and Imported into this Province as
Servants, or Otherwise, ch. CCXLVIII (May 1722), 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at 264-65. The act was followed in 1728
and 1729-1730 by acts prohibiting the landing of convicts in adjacent territories with
the intent that they journey to Pennsylvania. In 1731, Royal Instructions to the
Governor ordered that the convict laws not be approved; however, the Governor
ignored them. Such legislation continued to be passed throughout the 1730s and the
colony became notoriously slow in sending it to England. See HERRICK, supra note
30, at 123-31. In February 1738-39, the Privy Council considered the 1738 duty and
security on convicts. The report to the Privy Council advised repeal. It added:
according to the limitations of the patent... the proprietary of Pennsylvania
is obliged to transmit all laws passed in that province within the space of
five years after they shall have been enacted... but the Crown has reserved
to itself only the space of six months for considering of such laws after
their transmission, and if no decision is made thereupon by His Majesty
during that time, they acquire the same force as if they had been confirmed.
Given the distinct advantage to the proprietary, the report suggested that Pennsylvania
should engage to "be more punctually [sic].. . in such transmission." The report noted
that in the case of the convict legislation, the laws "have not been regularly
transmitted." Perceiving the colony's plan, the report explained that the laws therefore
"are sometimes prolonged, altered or amended even after the time fixed for laying
them before His Majesty." By this method of "renewing a law after it has remained
four years or longer in force they may perpetuate laws to the detriment of the
prerogative and of the interest of Great Britain." Report to the Lords of the
Committee of Council (February 21, 1738-1739), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at 466-68.
Not all the colonies continued to fight. Maryland's attempts to discourage the
trade in the 1720s were disallowed by the Board of Trade. In 1725 the governor of
Maryland recognized that so long as the colonists were willing to purchase the
convicts, they would be imported. See HERRICK, supra note 30, at 118 n.22;
JERNEGAN, supra note 34, at 53. Although Maryland did attempt to impose a duty on
convict importation, a 1751 Maryland act recognized the presence of imported convicts
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confusing that the Privy Council eventually approved an act establishing the
post of collector of duties on felons, while it continued to disapprove the
actual duties." These attempts to discourage convicts were recognized as
interference with a commerce by British Attorney General William Murray in
a 1775 opinion on Maryland's law. He concluded that such laws should be
repealed or declared null because "[b]y the same reason they might lay a duty
or even prohibit British goods."'24
Although there was "considerable opposition" to the convict trade on
"moral grounds," economics may have played the most powerful role in the
colonies' desire to exclude the convicts. "Experience had taught the planters
that they [the convicts] were hard to control and were liable at any moment
to run away."'25 Much of the convict legislation was designed to inform
purchasers as to whether the indentured servant was a convict and to make
money from their importation. Some laws required that the shipmaster present
to the port official a list of all persons on the ship. The official then returned
to the shipmaster a list of those who could be disposed of as indentured
servants. Other laws forced the shipmaster to post a bond as security for the
convicts' good behavior over the next year.'26
by making the testimony of "convicts imported into this province" admissible against
other convicts in court. An ACT to make the testimony of convicted persons legal
against convicted persons, ch. XI (May 1751), 1 LAws OF MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p.
(William Kilty ed., 1799-1800).
123. HERRICK, supra note 30, at 127. For information related to the Privy
Council repeals, see Papers relating to the acts passed by the forty-second assembly
... , 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at
502-4, 506, 507-8, 510-12.
124. The opinion of the attorney-general Murray.... May 6, 1755, in GEORGE
CHALMERS, 1 OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS PARTS OF ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE... at 333-36 (Burlington, Vermont ed. 1858). Murray, later to
become Lord Mansfield, reviewed the law that placed a duty of forty shillings on
imported convicts. He found no authority in any colonial assembly to pass such a law:
"I am of opinion that no colony can make such a law, because it seems to me in direct
opposition to the authority of the parliament of Great Britain." He noted that the law
would force courts to stop ordering the transportation of felons or require the Crown
to pay the duty. Id.
125. MCCORMAC, supra note 49, at 101, 103-4.
126. See legislation listed supra notes 118, 119. These methods were similar to
those used against the Irish. The importation of the Irish and convicts were linked by
Pennsylvania Governor Patrick Gordon in an opening speech to the Assembly on
December 17, 1728. See HERRICK, supra note 30, at 124.
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In Pennsylvania, the effort to protect purchasers of indentured servants
included discouraging convicts and "old persons, infants, maimed, lunatic or
any vagabond or vagrant persons [that] are imported." The 1729-1730 act
required that the importer of such an indentured servant give sufficient
security or transport the person out of the province. "For the better discovery"
of these persons, the act required the shipmaster to give an account of all the
indentured servants or passengers imported to the port collector. The mayor
or justices of the peace had to examine each passenger and give a certificate
permitting the persons fit to be "landed or disposed of."' 7 In 1742-43, a
new version of the statute made explicit that guaranteeing the investment of
purchasers of the imported servants was behind much of the attempt to
discourage infirm immigrants. The act stated:
And whereas it hath been a practice for masters of vessels, merchanis and
others, importers of servants into this province, to sell and dispose of such
servants as are infirm or afflicted with secret and loathsome diseases and
so otherwise disabled as to become useless and burdensome to the
purchasers, to the great damage and loss of the purchasers themselves and
to the province in general....
By affirming a cause of action for purchasers who bought indentured servants
that were "incapable of performing the ordinary or reasonable duties of
servants," the statute once again emphasized the perception that immigrants
were articles of commerce.'
127. An Act Imposing a Duty on Persons Convicted of Heinous Crimes and to
Prevent Poor and Impotent Persons being Imported into the Province of Pennsylvania,
ch. CCCXIV (February 1729-1730), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
1682-1801, supra note 87, at 164-71. The preamble to the statute stated:
Whereas many persons trading into this province have for lucre and private
gain imported, sold or disposed of, and daily do import passengers and
servants into this province who by reason of age, impotency or idleness
have become a heavy burden and charge upon the inhabitants thereof, and
likewise do frequently import divers persons convicted of heinous crimes,
who soon after their coming into this province, do often commit many
felonies, robberies, thefts and burglaries, to the great hurt of His Majesty's
subjects trading to and inhabiting the same.
Id. at 164. The collector and justices each were to be paid nine pence for the service.
Id. at 169. See also An Act Laying a Duty on Foreigners and Irish Servants Imported
into this Province, ch. CCCVII (May 1729), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at 135-40.
128. An Act Imposing a Duty on Persons Convicted of Heinous Crimes brought
into this Province and not Warranted by the Laws of Great Britain, and to Prevent
Poor and Impotent Persons being Imported into the same, ch. CCCLIV (February
1742-1743), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note
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The 1729-1730 statute is one of the few early colonial statutes to contain
a provision directed not at the importer but at the passenger. A provision
required a duty of forty shillings to be paid by any "alien bom out of the
allegiance of the King of Great Britain." Unlike most of the duties discussed,
this duty was to be paid by the immigrant. The duty was twice what a
shipmaster paid for an imported Irish servant or redemptioner. It is unclear
whether the double duty was designed to discourage nonindentured servants
or to charge whatever price the legislature believed could be paid.'29
Regardless of intention, in 1742-1743, the act was repealed. The 1742-1743
act did not require that a passenger pay duties; instead the act authorized the
ship owner to recover duties paid on behalf of a passenger. In addition, the
act emphasized that it should not be construed to "hinder the importation of
such servants or others who. . . can or may be legally imported."'30 Once
again, although a few provisions suggested a perception of immigrants who
were not indentured servants, these provisions did not dominate the legal
culture long enough to alter the background assumption that many immigrants
were imported articles of commerce.
87, at 360, 368-69. Colonial regulation of the indentured servant trade often reached
out to embrace other elements of the commerce that lay outside of the colony. In the
legal recognition of indentures made or begun outside of the colony, the colonies
revealed that they were dealing with a transatlantic and intercolonial trade. For
example, in 1715, Maryland recognized that Virginia indentured servants would serve
the amount of time that they would have served in Virginia. The same act established
that the time of servitude would begin at the "first anchoring of the vessel within this
province." But, if the vessel should "tarry" more than fourteen days in Virginia, then
the time of service would be reduced by that amount. An ACT relating to servants
and slaves, ch. XLIV (April 1715), 1 LAws OF MARYLAND, 1692-1799 n.p. (William
Kilty ed., 1799-1800).
129. An Act Laying a Duty on Foreigners and Irish Servants Imported into this
Province, ch. CCCVII (May 1729), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
1682-1801, supra note 87, at 136. Shipmasters importing Irish indentured servants had
to pay a twenty shilling duty under a following provision.
130. An Act Imposing a Duty on Persons Convicted of Heinous Crimes brought
into this Province and not Warranted by the Laws of Great Britain, and to Prevent
Poor and Impotent Persons being Imported into the Province of Pennsylvania, ch.
CCCLIV, (February 1742-1743), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
1682-1801, supra note 87, at 365.
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C. Initial Efforts to Protect Passengers Regulated as Commerce
Even when colonies began to protect passengers during the voyage, they
continued to affirm the trade in indentured servants. Among the colonies,
Pennsylvania moved most quickly in the direction of protectionism. Under
pressure from the Pennsylvania German Society, Pennsylvania passed statutes
in the mid-eighteenth century that sought to reform travel for immigrants.
Although these statutes demonstrate a concern with immigrants, they operated
within the assumption that the indentured servitude trade would continue as
a commerce.
One aspect of the laws aimed to reform the indentured payment system.
A 1765 act, directed at the trade in redemptioners, barred the shipmaster from
forcing "surviving relations" to pay for a passenger who died or a passenger
to pay for transported "relations."'' Despite the seemingly generous
provisions, Pennsylvania actually guaranteed the shipmaster most of the
passage fare. The act still required a husband to pay for his dead wife and
children, and children to pay for their dead parents. The act also authorized
indentures for longer than the regular statutory limit if necessary to pay for the
passage. Payment reform did not alter the trade.
Another aspect sought to alleviate the horrors of the passage. In 1750,
Pennsylvania passed an act "for prohibiting the importation of Germans or
other passengers in too great numbers in any one vessel." The act was
directed at the frequent practice "by masters and owners of vessels trading
within this province to import" so many people in a boat that disease spread.
The act required "good and wholesome [meat], drink and other necessaries"
and sufficient space for the passengers.' Some felt that these types of acts
131. A Supplement to the act, Entitled, "An Act For the Prohibiting the
Importation of Germans or Other Passengers in too great Numbers in any one Vessel,
ch. DXXVII, (May 1765), 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801,
supra note 87, at 432-41. The editors of the statute collection, James Mitchell and
Henry Flanders, believed that the 1765 Pennsylvania act had been "allowed to become
a law by lapse of time." Id at 440. Another author believed that it had been
disallowed by the Privy Council. JERNEGAN, supra note 34, at 225 n.30.
132. An Act for Prohibiting the Importation of Germans or other Passengers in
too great Numbers in any One Vessel, ch. CCCLXXXI (January 1749-1750), 5 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at 94-97. The act
specified that passengers older than fourteen must have room "at least six feet in length
and one foot six inches in breadth," but it permitted two passengers under fourteen to
occupy such a space. The following year, Massachusetts passed a similar act. An Act
to Regulate the Importation of Germans and Other Passengers coming to Settle in this
Province, ch. 12 (February 1750-1751), 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra note 101, at
536-37. One early example of passenger legislation appears in Virginia. In 1657-
1658, Virginia had a law which required shipmasters to provide four months of
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worked against the trade in immigrants. As several authors note, a similar
1755 act was vetoed by Pennsylvania Governor Robert Hunter Morris because
it was "'an absolute prohibition on the importation of Germans."" 33
Whether or not these acts decreased importation, they did little to alter the
danger of the journey."' For example, in 1758, a newspaper editor outside
of Pennsylvania estimated that 2000 passengers on 15 ships had died. 3 In
1765, the Pennsylvania Assembly amended the 1750 act because "experience"
demonstrated that "some further provision and regulation" was necessary. The
amended act specified the number of people who could be put in "one
bedstead," noting that a father or mother could have their children with them
if they so desired. A chest of medicines and an "able and well recommended
surgeon" had to be on board and they had to be free if the ship carried more
than fifty passengers. Twice a week the master of the vessel had to burn tar
between the decks and wash the ship with vinegar. He could not sell
"spirituous liquors" or food supplies at more that "fifty per centum profit."
Upon arrival, a bilingual German inhabitant of Philadelphia had to be brought
on the vessel to read the laws to and interpret for the passengers. Moreover,
the shipmaster had to arrange with custom officials so that the passengers,
ignorant of the custom laws, would not have their goods seized. 36 At least
one Philadelphia merchant, Thomas Clifford, took these acts seriously. His
instructions to his ships included washing them down with vinegar and leaving
a "six feet long & 20 inches or two feet broad" space for adults.'37 Once
again, however, the trade continued.
Throughout it all, importing indentured servants remained a trade, or, as
one author has termed it, "a thoroughly commercialized institution."'138 In
"victualls for passengers at their setting forth from the Downes or other parts of
England" and to ensure that "poor servants do not want cloathes and bedding." Act
VIII (March 1657-1658), 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE ... OF VIRGINIA, supra note 45,
at 435. Whether the act continued into force in the eighteenth century is not clear.
133. PROPER, supra note 93, at 52; HERRICK, supra note 30, at 163-64.
134. See Farley Grubb, Morbidity and Mortality on the North Atlantic Passage:
Eighteenth-Century German Immigration, 17 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 565, 566-85
(1987). Basing his evidence on surviving passenger manifests and bills of mortality
for Philadelphia, Grubb argues that the voyage mortality for adults was about 4 percent
and for children about 8 percent. For a contemporary discussion of the perils of the
voyage, see GOTTLIEB MITrELBERGER, JOURNEY TO PENNSYLVANIA 9-32 (Oscar
Handlin & John Clive ed., 1960).
135. See BILLY G. SMrrH, THE "LOWER SORT": PHILADELPHIA'S LABORING
PEOPLE, 1750-1800, at 43-45, n.7 (1990).
136. A Supplement to the act, ch. DXXVII (May 1765), 6 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at 432-40.
137. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 318.
138. STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 89.
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1740, Pennsylvania Governor George Thomas wrote to the Privy Council
concerning the "trade of servants." He believed that the trade produced great
losses to England. Merchants deluded tradesmen with "promises of mighty
advantages," persuaded them to come to Pennsylvania, and then sold "them for
their own benefit, the tradesmen not receiving one shilling of wages during the
whole time of a very hard servitude." The governor added that, when he had
"resolved to be neutral in the affair of servants," the Assembly had "rewarded"
him "with calumny" by cutting off half of his support.'39
Into the late eighteenth century, the perception remained that the
transportation of indentured servants was a trade. In 1788, Phineas Bond, the
British Consul, noted that the indentured servant trade had been revived after
the Revolution. Bond argued that the "trade [was] very oppressive" and a
drain on Ireland and Great Britain. He recognized that "very salutary laws to
regulate this trade" had been passed by Pennsylvania but concluded that they
were "too often evaded.""14  Because "the passenger trade" was "so
profitable" and "lucrative to those who are engaged in it," Bond predicted it
would be "carried on extensively."' 4'
IV. INDENTURED SERVANTS AND THE WANING OF THE COMMERCE
The indentured servitude trade did not end with the American
Revolution.'42 However, between the Revolution and the start of federal
immigration records in 1819, the cultural perception of immigrants began to
change. After describing in the first section the end of indentured servitude
as a central institution for immigration, the second section examines laws
passed during these fifty years that regulated immigration: the Constitution,
state convict regulation, and state protective measures. Changes in these areas
suggest that the perception that immigrants were articles of commerce was
becoming unstable.
139. Governor Thomas' objections to an act laying an excise ... (October 20,
1740), 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1801, supra note 87, at
474-75; see HERRICK, supra note 30, at 163-64.
140. Letters of Phineas Bond, British Consul at Philadelphia to the Foreign
Office of Great Britain, 1787, 1788, 1789, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, 1896 & 1897, at 513, 582 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., 1897-
1898) (letter of November 16, 1788); id. at 642-43 (letter of November 10, 1789); id.
at 613 (letter of August 15, 1789).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 582.
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A. The End of a Commerce
Although the Revolution had partially defined itself by a disagreement
over the migration to people to North America, the sporadic nature of
immigration to the United States before 1815 meant that little thought needed
to be given to the status of European immigrants. 43 Ironically, the war for
independence curbed migration to America until after the Peace of 1783.
Although immigration began again in 1784 and 1785, it ceased with the
French Revolution and the European Wars. After the Treaty of Amiens in
1801, it started once more. Between 1801 and 1802, as many as 20,000
people may have entered the United States. In 1803, however, new hostilities
closed most of Europe and President Thomas Jefferson's embargo in 1807
ended the remaining outlet for immigration from Ireland. In 1809,
immigration started up but was limited by British impressment and the
enforcement of a British passenger act limiting the number of people carried
on vessels. From 1812 to 1815, war again brought immigration to a virtual
halt. Overall, from 1790 to 1815, immigration was "hardly more than a
trickle."' 44
After 1815, immigration increased. To the contemporary observer, the
summers and falls of 1816, 1817, and 1818 brought a torrent of people to the
new nation. 145 Among these immigrants remained a number of indentured
143. The Declaration of Independence accused King George of endeavoring "to
prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose obstructing the Laws for
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration
thither." DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9.
144. HANSEN, supra note 107, at 77; see id. at 53-54, 67-71, 77; JONES, supra
note 107, at 64. Estimates on the numbers differ. Gemery states "that a minimum net
migration estimate for 1780-1820 is on the order of 400,000; and the conclusion that
the maximum level of migration could approach one million." Henry A. Gemery,
European Emigration to North America, 1700-1820: Numbers and Quasi-Numbers,
1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, NEw SERIES 283, 316-17 (1984). Others
have estimated 250,000 people between 1790 and 1815. See HANSEN, supra note 107,
at 77; TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORTS, BUREAu OF STATISTICS, ARRIVALS OF
ALIEN PASSENGERS AND IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1820 TO 1888,
at 7 (Washington 1889).
145. For accounts of the numbers of incoming emigrants, see, for example,
NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Jan. 13, 1816, at 348; Aug, 3, 1816, at 371-72; Aug. 10,
1816, at 400; Aug. 17, 1816, at 401; Aug. 24, 1816, at 419; Aug. 31, 1816, at 15;
Sept. 7, 1816, at 32; Sept. 21, 1816, at 61; Oct. 19, 1816, at 127; Aug. 30, 1817, at
16; Sept. 13, 1817, at 35; Sept. 27, 1817, at 79; Oct. 25, 1817, at 143; Nov. 1, 1817,
at 157; Jan. 10, 1818, at 314; May 2, 1818, at 175; May 23, 1818, at 223; May 30,
1818, at 240; June 6, 1818, at 256; July 11, 1818, at 244; Aug. 1, 1818, at 380; Aug.
8, 1818, at 408, 424.
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servants. With the increase in immigrants, came an increased appreciation of
the perils of their voyage. For example, on January 31, 1818, Niles' Weekly
Register reprinted an earlier report that five hundred of the eleven hundred
passengers who had boarded the ship April in Amsterdam had died on
route. 46 These concerns led to the spring 1819 passage of a federal act
designed to improve transoceanic travel.
But by the winter of 1819, the institution of imported indentured servants
had disappeared. The federal passenger act, sporadic moves towards
abolishing imprisonment for debt, changes in the cost of passage, international
restrictions, and new attitudes towards the institution have been cited as causes
of its disappearance. The catalyst seems to have been the 1819 national
economic collapse that prohibited importers from selling the passengers as
indentured servants and bankrupted the agents of the business. As one author
stated, "From this blow the redemptioner trade never recovered."147 The
crash, combined with growing national and international attention towards
race-based slavery, may have made re-establishment of white indentured
servitude impossible.
48
146. NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Jan. 31, 1818, at 378. For other accounts of
passage deaths, see, for example, NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Nov. 1, 1817, at 157;
July 11, 1818, at 344.
147. HANSEN, supra note 107, at 105. A few examples of imported indentured
servants can be found after 1819. For example, in April 1827, the American consul
in Rotterdam wrote to the governor of Georgia offering the service of certain people
as redemptioners if their passage far was advanced. NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Sept.
1, 1827, at 5, in EDITH ABBOTr, HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM
61 (reprint ed. 1969) (1926).
The economic collapse thesis appears in HANSEN, supra note 107, at 102-4.
Miller attributes the end to the 1819 Pennsylvania passenger act. Miller, supra note
31, at 134-36. Galenson suggests that the disappearance was linked to "a general
decline in the quantitative importance of immigration in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries." GALENSON, supra note 24, at 179. Salinger suggests that
"bound labor lost its financial attractiveness." SALINGER, supra note 30, at 151.
Herrick advances the abolition of debt and little demand for bound labor theses.
HERRICK, supra note 30, at 266. The change of attitude hypothesis depends on
documents such as the December 1819 Memorial to Congress from James Brown of
Tennessee who ran into difficulties when he attempted to get a court to recognize his
right to retain his runaway redemptioners. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (1832-), "Class
X: Miscellaneous," pt. II, at 550-59.
148. See STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 164-72.
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B. Immigrants as "Imports" or "Migrants"
During this period of fluctuating immigration, the assumption that
immigrants were articles of commerce began to change. Language in the
Constitution and state laws demonstrated that many people no longer
perceived immigrants as articles of commerce. By 1819, as indentured
servitude collapsed, a new federal passenger act, in essence, codified the
disappearance by acknowledging the existence of an immigration of
''passengers."
1. The Constitution
When the war ended and immigration to a new nation became a
possibility, delegates met at Philadelphia to write a Constitution. Ascertaining
their perspective on the location of immigration power is difficult. From our
modem perspective, no constitutional provision directly addressed
immigration.
Two clauses may have been intended to be applicable. Like much of the
Constitution, they appeared open, perhaps purposefully, to a variety of
meanings. Article I, section 8 stated that "the Congress shall have the power
... [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations.""49 If people moving from
one country to another constituted "commerce," then Congress seemed to have
the power to regulate them. But nowhere did the Constitution state whether
"commerce" included immigrants.
A similar lack of clarity surrounded article I, section 9:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty
may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person. "'50
On its face, section 9 appeared to apply to immigration. The language
suggested that the states initially possessed some power to admit-and,
therefore, to prohibit-the admission of people to their territory. Until 1808,
Congress seemed limited to imposing a tax on the importation of people. In
1808, however, section 9 seemed to suggest that Congress would be able to
prohibit any or all people from entering.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the absence of the
Constitution's immigration authority, see ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at
1-18.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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Nevertheless, although the word "migration" appears and the word
"importation" historically had been applied to the admission of indentured
servants and other passengers, to one group of delegates the importation or
admission of white Europeans was not of primary concern. For them, the
clause appears to have referred to a more immediate and controversial issue:
the slave trade. Just as throughout the Constitution the word "slave" does not
appear,' so in article I, section 9, a proposal for inserting "the importation
of slaves into North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia" was abandoned
lest the clause "give offense."'52  After the Convention ended, these
delegates-all from colonies such as Virginia and North Carolina where the
indentured servant trade had long since given way to the slave trade-could
not fathom how some could perceive "importation" to refer to white
immigrants. James Madison of Virginia noted, in Federalist 42, that some
had sought "to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution by
representing it . . . as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial
emigrations from Europe to America." He rejected such
"misconstructions."' In North Carolina, James Iredell attempted to clarify
the difference between immigrants and slaves. The word "imported" was the
key. He insisted that "migration" referred only to "free people" "who cannot
be said to be imported" and therefore only "imported" slaves would be
151. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (import
and migration clause); art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (direct tax clause); art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive
slave clause); art. V (no amendment clause). For a discussion of slavery during the
Convention, see, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention:
Making a Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 188-225 (Richard Beeman et al.
eds., 1987).
152. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966); id. at 364-65 (Aug. 21); id. at 369-75, 378 (Aug. 22); id at 396, 400 (Aug. 24);
id. at 408-9, 415-17 (Aug. 25); see MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 149-51 (1913); Finkelman, supra note 151, at
211-18. The quote is from Gouvemour Morris, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra, at 415; see also JAMES MADISON, 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 1427-29 (1840) ("Mr. Madison thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution
the idea that there could be property in men") (Aug. 25, 1787).
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taxed." 4 Congress might not have power over those-white immigrants-
who were not "imported."
154. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 100-2 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter
DEBATES] (debate in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 26, 1788). For
those who interpreted the clause as referring only to the slave trade, its existence
briefly raised the issue of the limitations of state or federal power over commerce.
The existence of federal power over commerce, let alone immigration, was unclear.
In the Virginia Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph argued that the "exception
made respecting the importation of negroes" arose "[n]ot from a general power," but
from the expressly enumerated power given to the general government "of regulating
commerce." 3 THE DEBATES, supra, at 464. The sentiment was echoed by Madison:
"As to the restriction in the clause under consideration, it was a restraint on the
exercise of a power expressly delegated to Congress; namely, that of regulating
commerce with foreign nations." Id. at 455. Others in Virginia perceived no express
grant of power to Congress for the purposes of restricting entry and grew concerned
that the clause demonstrated that Congress could obtain powers by implication. Patrick
Henry argued that "the insertion of these restrictions on Congress was a plain
demonstration that Congress could exercise power by implication." Id at 455.
The Convention's establishment of a constitutional relation between federal
commerce power and certain state regulations has been much debated. In the early
twentieth century, Felix Frankfurter asserted that, in the federal convention and the
Constitution, the "conception that the mere grant of the commerce power to Congress
dislodged state power finds no expression." FRANKFURTER, supra note 12, at 13.
Another author summarized his understanding of the federal convention's position: "It
seems to have been common ground that the general government as constituted-or
reconstituted- . . . was to possess a power of regulating commerce. It was by no
means so universally agreed that there should be a clause granting it the power 'to
regulate commerce."' Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 432 (1941).
After the convention, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 32 articulated a vision
of federalism that might support the opposite conclusion. He argued that "the State
governments would clearly retain all the right of sovereignty which they before had,
and which were not, by that act, exclusivelydelegated to the United States." Exclusive
delegation occurred, according to Hamilton, only (1) where the Constitution granted
it in "express terms," (2) "where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union,
and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority," or (3) "where
it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant." THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at
200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1945).
With arguments about an exclusive or non-exclusive commerce power both
available, the interpretation of the Constitution's Commerce Clause remained for the
Supreme Court to decide "without substantial guidance or restriction by previous
discussion and analysis." FRANKFURTER, supra note 12, at 14; see Edward S. Corwin,
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1950).
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But, to others, "importation" did not signify only slavery. Those from
states such as Pennsylvania and Maryland, where the trade in indentured
servants had continued into the late eighteenth century, thought that the clause
could refer to white immigrants. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania worried
in the federal constitutional convention that the clause would permit Congress
to "tax freemen imported." 5' In the Maryland convention, Luther Martin
reported that, although the phrase had been intended to refer only to slaves,
it would probably permit the taxing of all immigrants. 56 And in the
Pennsylvania convention, Robert Whitehill replied to a speech by James
Wilson by suggesting that unless one was "ignorant of the English language,"
the phrase's use of "importation" also referred to the "migration of
Europeans."'5 7 To these delegates, Congress might have exclusive power
over immigration.
The continuation of slavery and the end of indentured servitude had begun
to alter the traditional perception that British and European immigrants were
imported articles of commerce. Yet the change was gradual and regional. To
some, "importation," and perhaps "commerce," referred to immigrants,
indentured servants, and slaves. To others, "imported" could refer only to
slaves-or, at the most, involuntary imported convicts. The words were not
a compromise. Both sides thought that they knew what the words meant.
They just believed the words meant different things. This disjunction meant
that the Constitution contained the seeds for conflicting theories about federal
immigration power.
2. The End of the Convict Trade
The efforts to end the convict trade betrayed the same uncertainty about
the word "importation." After the Revolution, the British had attempted to
return to transporting convicts to North America. By June 1785, however, a
Parliamentary Committee concluded that "the Ports of the United States have
been shut against the Importation of Convicts." ' The new nation wanted
to ensure that convict importation would stay ceased. In the interim period
between the final ratification of the Constitution and the start of the new
155. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 152, at 417 (Aug.
25). George Mason of Virginia assured him that the tax was not aimed at voluntary
migration but had been necessary to prevent the introduction of convicts. Id.
156. 1 THE DEBATES, supra note 154, at 372-73.
157. 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONsTrTuTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 831
(Dec. 3, 1787) (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
158. Report of Parliamentary Committee on Convicts, June 1785, Home Office
42/6, quoted in EKIRCH, supra note 44, at 236.
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government, the Continental Congress passed a resolution on the convict
trade.'59
In the Continental Congress, a resolution was proposed that the states
"pass laws prohibiting the importation of convicts from territories of foreign
nations." Without comment, the final resolution replaced the words,
"importation of convicts." The final resolution, passed on September 16,
1788, recommended "to the several states to pass proper laws for preventing
the transportation of convicted malefactors from foreign countries into the
United States."' 6 The choice not to use the word "importation" in reference
to convicts was not necessarily followed in the states. For example,
Pennsylvania's statute sought to "prevent the importation of convicts" by
authorizing a three-month prison sentence and a fifty-pound per person fine
on any importer.16' For others, however, convicts were no longer to be
"imported."
3. State Protective Regulation
"Imported" immigrants also disappeared from state legislation. As states
permanently barred the convict trade and, with the exception of South
Carolina and Georgia, moved to bar the slave trade, state legislation over the
indentured servant trade no longer seemed to be regulating a form of
commerce. The willingness to encourage the trade decreased as most
legislation increasingly sought to protect the immigrant. For example, as early
as 1799, although New York continued to recognize indentures for people
"coming from beyond the sea," minors could not be bound past twenty-one to
pay passage. No longer were shipmasters guaranteed the passage fare and a
retum on their investment.162
159. June 21, 1788, the ninth state, New Hampshire, ratified the Constitution.
On September 13, the Continental Congress set March 4 for the commencement of the
new government's operation. 1 DEBATES, supra note 154, 1097-98, 1099.
160. 34 THE JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 528-29
(W.C. Ford ed., 1904-1937). The apparent earlier version appears in note 3 without
any commentary. All italics are the author's.
161. An ACT to prevent the importation of convicts into this commonwealth, ch.
CCCCLXIII (March 1789), STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 692-93. For a
general account, see EKIRCH, supra note 44, at 230-38. Authors differ over which
states followed the Resolution. A nineteenth-century author lists Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. JOHN
P. SANDERSON, REPUBLICAN LANDMARKS: THE VIEwS AND OPINIONS OF AMERICAN
STATESMEN ON FOREIGN IMMIGRATION 49 (1856). Miller lists South Carolina,
Connecticut, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Miller, supra note 31, at 137
n.19, 140.
162. AN ACT to amend..., ch. 80 (April 1799), 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
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Twenty years later-almost a decade after the transatlantic slave trade had
ended, almost three decades after the convict trade had ceased-the only
legally "imported" persons were British and Europeans. Despite this reality
of a continuing trade in imported white immigrants, the statutes abandoned
references to indentured servants as "imported." Under pressure from
immigrant associations, Maryland passed a passenger act in 1817. The
preamble stated,
WHEREAS, it has been found that German and Swiss emigrants, who for
the discharge of the debt contracted for their passage to this country, are
often obliged to subject themselves to temporary servitude, are frequently
exposed to cruel and oppressive impositions by the masters of the vessels
in which they arrive, and likewise by those to whom they become servants.
Expressing concern over the passenger as an "emigrant" in "debt" who might
have to become an indentured servant, the act contained a list of protective
measures requiring bilingual registers, mandatory schooling of minors, and
limitations on passage payment.
1 63
NEw YORK... EIGHTH, NINTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH SESSIONS 329-31 (1886).
The 1801 act allowed minors to be bound only to twenty-four, "provided the term of
such service shall not exceed four years in the whole." AN ACT concerning
apprentices and servants, ch. 11 (February 1801), 5 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION 14, 17 (1887). The 1799 act's provisions for
reporting continued 1801. AN ACT for the settlement and relief of the poor, ch. 184
(April 1801), id. at 521-23.
Other post-Revolution New York acts adopted a similar theory. New York's
1788 law for the settlement of the poor explicitly referred to "foreigners" who had to
be reported to the recorder. AN ACT concerning apprentices and servants, ch. 15
(February 1788); AN ACT for the better settlement and relief of the poor, ch. 62 (May
1788), 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK EIGHTH, NINTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH
SESSIONS 620, 622-23, 731, 742-43 (1886). In 1797, New York amended the act to
require the shipmaster to report the "name and occupation" of every person brought
into the port. A shipmaster who did not report became liable to a fine of fifty dollars
per United States citizen and seventy-five dollars per foreigner. AN ACT to amend
I ch. 101 (April 1797) 4 LAws OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK TWENTIETH,
TWENTY-FIRST, TWENTY-SECOND AND TWENTY-THIRD SESSIONS 134-35 (1887).
163. An act relative to German and Swiss Redemptioners, ch. 226 (February
1818), LAWS OF MARYLAND [DECEMBER SESSION 1817] 224-26. The act required the
appointment of a bilingual register of indentures, the inclusion in the indentures of
minors of mandatory two months of schooling per year, and a limitation of four years
of service by adult immigrants. An immigrant could not be detained more than thirty
days on board a vessel. During this time the master had to provide provisions without
any cost to the immigrant. If a passenger had died after "the expiration of one half
of the duration of the voyage," his or her property could be sold to pay for the fare,
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One year later, in 1818, Pennsylvania statutes demonstrated the growing
distinction between the immigrants and "articles of commerce." The
legislation continued the substantive provisions of the state's pre-revolutionary
passenger laws. The provisions, however, now were divided into two separate
acts. One act contained elements relating to the ship and to transatlantic
commerce-food provisions, passage fares, and ship cleanliness. 64 Another
act contained elements relating to the immigrant-regulations relating to the
passenger's discharge from the vessel, the liability for passage, the procedures
for indenture, and the reporting of passengers to the register. Curiously,
however, revealing that the perceptions remained unsettled, the legislature
placed the elements involving the ships under a title that suggested the
regulatory power lay in a traditional power of the state over health and welfare
while the sections regarding passengers remained in an act addressing
"importation.", 165
C. The Beginning of Immigration: The Federal Passenger Act
Demonstrating a similar concern for immigrants and a similar ambiguity
over the perception of immigrants, Congress began work in 1818 on a bill
regulating passenger ships. The federal government's belief that immigrants
were commerce had been expressed four years earlier by John Quincy Adams
in an argument to the British that passengers were to be classified as
commerce. 6' The traditional understanding that immigrants were "articles
but the remaining proceeds went to the family. If no one claimed the money, after
three years, the German Society of Maryland collected it.
164. AN ACT For establishing a Health Office, and to secure the City and Port
of Philadelphia from the introduction of pestilential and contagious diseases, and for
other purposes, ch. XXX (January 1818), AcTs OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ... OF
PENNSYLVANIA ... [1817 SESSION] 38-62 (1818). Regulations limited the number of
people per vessel to one person for "every two tons custom house measurement,"
required the ship to carry adequate provisions and a physician, mandated that the ship
be washed with vinegar, and barred the shipmaster from permitting passengers credit
for liquor over four dollars during passage. Id. at 54.
165. AN ACT For regulating the importation of German and other passengers,
ch. XXXV (February 1818), id. at 66-72. Aware that the two laws "would be in a
great degree defeated unless regulations of the same, or of a similar import shall be
adopted by the state of Delaware," the Assembly passed a resolution requesting the
governor to transmit the copies of both laws to the Governor of Delaware, "with a
request that he would lay the same before the legislature and invite their adoption of
similar regulations." Resolution, ch. III (February 1818), id. at 310-11.
166. See HANSEN, supra note 107, at 83. Adams wanted to prove that the 1815
commercial treaty barred enforcement of the British passenger act limiting the number
of passengers carried by American ships leaving Ireland. In 1816, the British "granted
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of commerce" appeared in the fact that the Committee on Commerce and
Manufacturing introduced the bill. Most of the provisions of the bill were not
unusual but imitated British, Pennsylvania, and Maryland legislation. The
only unusual aspect was the federal nature of the legislation. No debate,
however, appears to have occurred over the power of the government to pass
the bill or the substance of the bill. Noting only "the crowded state" of the
vessels and the "many lives" that had been lost, Congress passed the final
version of the act on May 2, 1819.167
American vessels in English and Irish ports the same quota as the British." HANSEN,
supra note 107, at 83.
167. An Act regulating passenger ships and vessels, ch. XLVI (March 1819), 3
Stat. 488-89 (1819). For the legislative history of the bill, see 31 THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ... 1222 (15th Congress,
1st Session) (Dec. 1, 1817-Apr. 20, 1818) (1854); 33 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CONGRESS .. ., supra, at 80, 112-113, 205, 206, 1037 (15th Congress, 2d
Session) (Nov. 16, 1818-Mar. 3, 1819) (1855); 34 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CONGRESS .. ., supra, at 1393, 2496-98 (15th Congress, 2d Session) (Nov. 16,
1818-Mar. 3, 1819) (1855).
Problems under the act involved how to estimate the tonnage, by what country's
measure, and whether deductions should be made for children or crew. See United
States v. The Louisa Barbara, 26 Fed. Cas. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 15,632). The
act limited the passengers to two persons per five tons "according to custom-house
measurement." It also required passenger ships leaving for Europe to carry sufficient
provisions. Although the act may have been more effective than state acts, the federal
act contained ambiguities that rendered it "merely a regulatory, not a restrictive,"
measure. HANSEN, supra note 107, at 102; see E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, at 20-22 (1981).
For contemporary references to the bill, see NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Dec. 19,
1818, at 292; Jan. 15, 1820, at 322; WILLIAM RAWLE, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED
BEFORE THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING AGRICULTURE, JANUARY 19,
1819, at 22 (1819). A guide for immigrants published in the early 1830s printed the
passenger act and then added: "When paupers are sent by the parish, it is imperative
that each family should have at least five pounds, and be able to produce it before they
will be allowed by the American Government to set a foot in the United States:
should this not be attended to, they will not be allowed to land." S.H. COLLINS, THE
EMIGRANT'S GUIDE ... 67-70 (Hull, England, 4th ed. n.d.). The bill had no such
requirement.
Congress had previously passed one other law affecting passengers. A 1799 act
stated that "the wearing apparel, and other personal baggage, and the tools or
implements of a mechanical trade only, of persons who arrive in the United States,
shall be free and exempted from duty." An Act to regulate the collection of duties on
imports and tonnage, ch. 110 (March 1799), 1 Stat. 645-47 (1799). A discussion of
the statute's relevance for immigrants appears in CALVIN COLTON, MANUAL FOR
EMIGRANTS TO AMERICA 180-81 (1832).
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Yet, even as the act reaffirmed the old assumption that people entering
were "articles of commerce," the act also revealed the newer perception that
those entering were "passengers." With economic collapse, 1819 had brought
the end of indentured servitude. With the new act, 1819 brought the
beginning of a new institution: "immigration." Included apparently by
amendment, the last section of the act required the ship captain to report "the
age, sex, and occupation, of the said passengers, respectively, the country to
which they severally belong, and that of which it is their intention to become
inhabitants." The custom officials were required to deliver copies of these
reports to the Secretary of State who, in turn, would report to Congress.
These reports began what would become the official records of immigration
to the United States.'
68
The beginning of immigration records and the end of indentured servitude
did not simplify the legal regulation of immigration. The remnants of two
centuries of colonial experience in regulating bound labor remained. The
Constitution's Commerce Clause, the federal passenger act, and the duty-bond-
list structure of state acts regulating entry gave witness to an assumption that
immigrants were "articles of commerce." But the linguistic transformation
from "imports" to "passengers" or "migrants" that immigrants had undergone
in these same acts appeared to argue in favor of an opposite assumption that
immigrants were not "articles of commerce." In 1819, both assumptions could
coexist.
V. IMMIGRANTS AS "ARTICLES OF COMMERCE"?-THE STRUGGLE
Both assumptions, however, could not long continue to exist. In 1820,
New York reaffirmed, "notwithstanding the repeal, modification, or alteration
of the laws of the United States," that masters of vessels had to report their
passengers to the custom house. 69 State laws like this one, the continuation
of old efforts to regulate the indentured servant trade, would become the major
weapons of state efforts to exclude immigrants during the nineteenth
168. An Act regulating passenger ships and vessels, ch. XLVI (March 1819), 3
Stat. 488-489 (1819). Hutchinson states that the "uninterrupted series of immigration
data for the United States does in fact start with the 1819 Act." HUTCHINSON, supra
note 167, at 22. Nineteenth-century immigration authors also stated that the period of
immigration began in 1820 with the collection of statistics. See WILLIAM J.
BROMWELL, HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 13-15 (1856);
RICHMOND MAYO-SMrH, EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
SCIENCE 37 (1890).
169. AN ACT to amend..., ch. CCXXII (April 1820), LAws OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK . . . FORTY-THIRD SESSION 203 (1820); CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1789-1835, at 608 (1937).
[Vol. 61
50
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/1
STRUGGLE OVER IMMIGRATION
century. 7 ' Over fifty years would pass before the Supreme Court resolved
the constitutionality of such laws. The passage of time made the issue
increasingly difficult. Four cases gradually clarified that state immigration
restrictions could not be decided until the Court decided explicitly whether
people were "articles of commerce." Perceptions arising from the continued
existence of slavery would cause justice after justice to hesitate and eventually
angrily to disagree.
A. Gibbons: Almost an Assumption
In 1824, the Supreme Court heard the first case to raise the issue of
people as "articles of commerce." Gibbons v. Ogden involved a steamboat
monopoly originally granted to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton by
New York, operated under license by New Jersey Governor Aaron Ogden.
After a number of quarrels with Ogden, Thomas Gibbons began a rival
steamboat company. On October 18, 1818, Ogden filed for an injunction
against Gibbons. The litigation that followed reached the Court for decision
in 1824. Represented by Daniel Webster and the United States Attorney
General William Wirt, Gibbons prevailed. Although the sophisticated
arguments of counsel and lengthy opinion by Justice Marshall fill 240 pages
of the United States Reports, Marshall decided the case ultimately by
concluding that the federal Coasting Act of 1793 which licensed Gibbons was
supreme over and displaced conflicting state statutes.' 7'
Court observers, however, believed that the Court decided grander
questions of the federal relationship. William Gibbons wrote to his father,
Thomas, on February 23, 1824:
in the course of the conversation with Webster today, he told me
confidentially that one of the Judges had said, that up to the time of his
opening the cause a majority of the Court were under the impression that
it was merely a question of collision between a right derived under the New
York Laws and a right derived from the U. States-that they were to
decide-but after hearing the argument they have changed that opinion &
consider it more than collision[,] that it is a broad constitutional question
upon which scarcely any doubt exists.1'7
170. For a summary of state laws, see HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 396-404.
171. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); MAURICE BAXTER, THE
STEAMBOAT MONOPOLY: GIBBONs v OGDEN 3-36 (1966). James Kent, overruled by
Gibbons, asserted the limited nature of the Court's decision in Gibbons. James Kent,
1 COMMENTARIES IN AMERICAN LAW 432-39 (reprint ed. 1884) (13th ed. 1826);
BAXTER, supra, at 71.
172. DANIEL WEBSTER, 3:1 PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL PAPERS 289
(1989) (William Gibbons to Thomas Gibbons, February 23, 1824). Gibbons felt that
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Marshall's lengthy exposition, however, created, rather than resolved, doubts
on broad constitutional questions."'
"like all the lawyers," Webster was "unreasonable in relation to Money Matters." He
added, "It would not be a matter of surprise to me if he had the opinion of the Judges
in his possession & meant to delay it until the matter of fees was settled." Id Prior
to the decision, Webster had guessed that the case would revolve around the "collision"
between federal and state law. Soon after argument, however, he knew that the
opinion might reach beyond the supremacy issue. Id. at 288 n.87 (Daniel Webster to
Jeremiah Mason, February 15, 1824).
Earlier decisions suggested that the case would be decided as to whether
concurrent state authority over commerce existed. Indeed, in an earlier decision about
the steamboat before the New York state courts, Chancellor James Kent had decided
that the existence of laws relating to importation proved the presence of concurrent
state commerce authority. Kent wrote that the states
exercise, to a considerable degree, a concurrent power with congress in the
regulation of external commerce. What are ... [these] but regulations of
external commerce? Our health and quarantine law, and the laws
prohibiting the importation of slaves, are striking examples of the same
kind. So the act relative to the poor, which requires all masters of vessels
coming from abroad to report and give security to the mayor of New York,
that the passengers, being aliens, shall not become chargeable as paupers,
and in case of default, making even the ship or vessel from which the alien
shall be landed liable to seizure, is another and very important regulation
affecting foreign commerce.
Livingston & Fulton v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 580 (N.Y. 1812).
173. Marshall toyed with, but did not adopt, the idea that the federal government
had exclusive power over commerce. See BAXTER, supra note 171, at 48-52;
FRANKFURTER, supra note 12, at 17-25. Some early commentators claimed that
Gibbons did hold the exclusiveness of federal commerce power. For example, in
1898, one treatise stated, "In the opinion of the court, the supremacy of Federal
authority, and the exclusive character of the national control of commerce, were clearly
defined." E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTrruTON 16 (1898).
Similarly, Marshall neither approved nor rejected the idea that some concurrent
state authority over commerce might exist. Marshall did not adopt the idea of
concurrent state commerce power suggested by Kent. He hinted, instead, that a state
might govern some areas relating to commerce under its power to "regulate its police."
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 208-10. The theory of "regulations of police" had been advanced
by Webster as ajustification for state laws on quarantines, ferries, and bridges. It bore
some resemblance to Blackstone's category of "offenses against the public health, and
the public police or economy." WILLAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 161-75 (Sharswood ed., 1882) (1765-1769). Blackstone and
others had seen the police power as one government's power over internal matters.
Blackstone had suggested an idea of "police" which involved:
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Most of the commentary on Gibbons surrounds the broader constitutional
statements made in the case.'74 Yet lurking amid these statements was a
series of sentences about whether people were "articles of commerce." The
question arose unsurprisingly in Gibbons because steamboats carried
passengers for hire. For both the lawyers, Marshall and Johnson, the idea that
"commerce" included people was almost an assumption. Gibbons, however,
demonstrated that the assumption was becoming open to question.
The lawyers for Ogden hesitatingly raised the issue near the end of their
arguments. Thomas Oakley suggested that the "transportation of persons, or
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the
individuals of the state, like the members of a well governed family, are
bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good
neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious and
inoffensive in their respective station.
Id. at 162. However, the right of a single sovereign to worry about wandering gypsies
and lotteries did not necessarily lead to the right of a state to regulate the entry of
immigrants. As argued by Webster and noted by Marshall, the police power seemed
a route to the empowerment of two sovereign authorities. See generally
FRANKFURTER, supra note 12, at 24-27.
The origins of the police power are unclear. According to Paul Freund, not until
1829, did any state begin to use "police" as a division within its statutes. See ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, at 2
n.2 (reprint ed. 1981) (1904) (the term first appeared in New York's Revised Statutes).
For extremely brief and speculative discussions of the origins of police power before
Gibbons, see W.P. PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW OF
OVERRULING NECESSrrY 4, 8 (1894); W.G. Hastings, The Development of Law as
Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the States, 39
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 359, 361-67 (1900);
FREUND, supra at 2; CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS
OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1886). For a discussion of the origins
of the "police power" as a theory of a regulated society, as opposed to a repository of
state powers in opposition to federal commerce power, see William J. Novak,
Intellectual Origins of the State Police Power: The Common-Law Vision of a Well-
Regulated Society (University of Wisconsin Legal History Working Paper No. 3-2,
1989). For a discussion of the political implications of "police," see TOMLINS, supra
note 23, at 35-97.
174. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 13, at 568-84 (discussing Gibbons as a case
of "federal supremacy"); PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970, at 9-25 (1970); BERNARD C. GAvr, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTrruTION 7-16 (reprint ed. 1970) (1932); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: States and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49
U. CHI. L. REv. 887, 938-53 (1982) (Currie acknowledges in a footnote the issue of
whether passengers were commerce).
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passengers for hire!' was a "distinct business" from "commerce. '175 Yet
Oakley gave no reasons for the distinction except that it was "notorious."
Thomas Emmet repeated the distinction between vessels engaged in trade or
commerce and those carrying passengers for hire. 76 He even concluded that
the passenger act of 1819 was unconstitutional because Congress could not
"regulate the conveyance of mere passengers.""' Nevertheless, these
statements never seemed to coalesce into an argument. Although Emmet
accepted that "the importation of slaves is, and has always been, considered
as a branch of commerce,"'78  he was only able to assert that "mere
passengers" could not be regulated. He made no concerted attempt to explain
why passengers were not commerce. Indeed, so fleeting seemed the argument
that William Wirt's only response was to state:
That the regulation of commerce and navigation, includes the authority of
regulating passenger vessels as well as others, would appear from the most
approved definitions of the term commerce. It always implies
intercommunication and intercourse.'79
The perception that people were "articles of commerce" remained relatively
unscathed by the oral arguments.
Marshall's opinion seemed not to question the assumption that commerce
included people. His great definition of commerce followed Wirt's approach
both in its words and in its assertion of conventional wisdom:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more-it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations....
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word1commerce," to comprehend navigation. 8 '
"All America" and "uniformly understood" left little room for an argument
that "commerce" did not include people. The assumption that "commerce"
included people also underlay Marshall's discussion of article I, section 9.
After explaining that the section confirmed congressional commerce power,
175. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 76.
176. Id. at 89-90, 95-96.
177. Id. at 96. As a footnote to this statement, Emmet cited state legislation that
required reporting of passengers "imported or landed." Id. at 97 n.a.
178. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 182-83.
180. Id. at 189-90. Charles Warren discovered perhaps the most interesting
commentary on the choice of the word "intercourse" by Henry Seawall: "I shall soon




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/1
STRUGGLE OVER IMMIGRATION
Marshall noted that "this section proves that the power to regulate commerce
applies equally to the regulation of vessels employed in transporting men, who
pass from place to place voluntarily, and to those who pass involuntarily."''8
Justice Johnson's concurrence echoed the assumption that people were
"articles of commerce." Indeed, his definition of commerce even more
explicitly accepted people as commodities: "Commerce, in its simplest
signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society,
labor, transportation, intelligence, care ... become commodities, and enter
into commerce... ." Johnson believed the "understanding of the framers" as
shown in article I, section 9 "considers the right of controlling personal ingress
or migration, as implied in the powers previously vested in congress over
commerce." Johnson added, "although the leading object of this section
undoubtedly was the importation of slaves, yet the words are obviously
calculated to comprise persons of all descriptions." He concluded, "it is
almost laboring to prove a self-evident proposition, since the sense of
mankind, the practice of the world, the contemporaneous assumption, [the]
continued exercise of the power, and universal acquiescence, have so clearly
established the right of congress over.., transportation of both men and their
goods. ...
Yet despite these general assertions by both men that "commerce"
included persons, Marshall explicitly refrained from making his assumptions
about people as "objects of commerce" a part of the final decision. He noted,
"If a real difference could be admitted to exist between vessels carrying
passengers and others, it has already been observed, that there is no fact in this
case which can bring up that question." He noted that steamboats' "principal
employment is the transportation of merchandise." Read carefully, Marshall's
opinion not only avoided deciding the issue, it actually appeared to invite
debate. Indeed, seen in this light, Johnson's concurrence may have been
motivated as much by his disagreement over Marshall's refusal to declare
persons "articles of commerce" as it was by Marshall's reluctance to find
federal commerce power exclusive.'83
181. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 207, 216-17.
182. Id at 229-31 (Johnson, J., concurring).
183. Marshall and Johnson were both southerners. Both men "deplored the
continued practice of the slave trade." WHrrE, supra note 13, at 688; see Eskridge &
Ferejohn, supra note 7, at 1372. Marshall did not own slaves; Johnson did. In 1822,
however, Johnson had written an anonymous article opposing procedures used to try
slaves-including Denmark Vesey-accused of planning a rebellion. And in 1823,
Johnson had written an opinion invalidating South Carolina's attempt to keep free
black seamen from leaving their ships. The opinion assumed that the seamen of any
nation were part of foreign commerce. Elikson v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 495
(C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366); see Scott Wallace Stucky, Elikson v. Deliesseline:
Race and the Constitution in South Carolina, 1823, 14 N.C. CEN. L. J. 361, 361-405
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Why did Marshall technically avoid reaching a decision that would declare
that passengers were "objects of commerce"? Perhaps he was simply
responding to every argument put forward by counsel. Perhaps he was simply
demonstrating his legal ability to see each step in an argument. But perhaps
Emmet's argument of a distinction between white passengers and black slaves
as the "objects of commerce" within the general political culture surrounding
the Missouri Compromise of 1820-1821 and the Court's recent struggle over
the slave trade cases gave Marshall pause. Gibbons thus left a narrow opening
for a future argument that passengers were not articles of commerce."'
Just as Marshall never resolved the problem of national and state
commerce power, so too did he never return to resolve whether all persons
were the "objects of commerce." The two commerce cases that followed
Gibbons provided no answer. Brown v. Maryland involved Maryland's license
tax on importers of foreign goods. 8 ' Willson v. The Black-Bird Creek
Marsh Company involved a dam permitted by Delaware over a "small
navigable creek[] into which the tide flows." With respect to the commerce
power problem, one author has noted that Marshall left "the issue of
concurrent state authority over commerce in such doubt that both proponents
of exclusive national power and defenders of concurrent power could cite
Gibbons to support their views."'86  Future cases would soon prove that
Marshall had left the issue over people as "articles of commerce" in a similar
position. Marshall's refusal explicitly to hold what both he and Johnson
suggested was a common cultural perception opened the door to future cases
that might conclude that certain persons were not "articles of commerce."
(1984); DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER:
THE CAREER AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE 193-206
(1954); WHITE, supra note 13, at 341, 689; see also Paul Finkelman, The Crime of
Color, 67 TuL. L. REV. 2063, 2098-99 (1993).
184. For a discussion of the slave trade cases, see WHITE, supra note 13, at 687-
703; SWISHER, supra note 7, at 378-81. Currie notes that "Marshall had already said
on circuit that the commerce power authorized Congress to outlaw the importation of
persons." Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 938 n.369.
For a discussion of the complexity of slavery thought, see William W. Fisher, Ideology
and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1051 (1993).
185. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S (12 Wheat.) 419, 419-20 (1827). Marshall
struck down the state statute as unconstitutional, not because it infringed upon an
exclusive federal commerce power, but because, once again, it conflicted with a federal
statute.
186. Willson v. The Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
Marshall upheld the state statute because it did not conflict with any federal law and
seemed motivated by acceptable state objectives.
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B. Miln: Hesitant Disagreement
The 1830s brought little chance that the door would be closed. As Carl
Swisher notes, cases about the Commerce Clause raised the problems of
"nationalism versus localism" and "the South's 'peculiar institution"'-
"Immigration... raised problems of its own, quite apart from the fact that
lawmaking for transportation or exclusion of white alien passengers had
implications for the transportation of free Negroes and Slaves."'87 This
background, combined with major changes of the Court's personnel,
highlighted the issue of whether immigrants were "objects of commerce."
But the 1830s did not resolve the question; indeed, they merely began to
demonstrate a hesitant disagreement within the Court. This vague
disagreement would be largely responsible for the Court's inability to reach
a decision in 1837 in Mayor of the City of New York v. Miln. Miln involved
a New York law that required the master of any ship arriving in the port of
New York to report passenger information and to post bonds for passengers
who might become poor and chargeable to the city.'88 The case arose out
of an action for debt incurred by George Miln, cosignee of the ship, the Emily.
The declaration alleged that William Thompson, master of the Emily, had
arrived in New York in August 1829 with one hundred foreign passengers and
failed to make a report. The Court only construed the first provision requiring
a report and did not address whether sureties or bonds could be required.'
The gradual transformation of indentured servitude legislation into state
immigration regulation and the increasing tensions over slavery left the Court
puzzled over whether the focus of the New York legislation was foreign poor
persons or the objects of a great transatlantic trade in immigrants.
187. SWISHER, supra note 7, at 396.
188. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). Information
had to be reported to the mayor or recorder within twenty-four hours. Information
included the name, place of birth, last legal settlement, age, and occupation of all
passengers either landed at the port or landed elsewhere with the intention of
proceeding to New York. The statute authorized a penalty of seventy-five dollars for
each passenger falsely or not reported. Additional provisions required the shipmaster
to post sureties of a sum not to exceed three hundred dollars for every passenger
landed, to indemnify the city for expenses of any passenger who might become poor
and chargeable to the city within two years. If the shipmaster wrongly failed to give
a bond for anyone not a United States citizen, a penalty of five hundred dollars per
passenger could be imposed. Id. at 130-31.
189. Miln, 36 U.S. at 104-5, 130-31. In one place, the case suggested that the
debt amounted to $15,000; however, Justice Barbour's opinion placed it at $7,500, the
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When Miln first reached the Court in 1834, the Court refused to decide
the case. Whatever their disagreements in Gibbons, Marshall and Johnson,
joined by Story and Duvall, appear to have thought that the state statute was
unconstitutional. Justice Johnson, however, could not participate because of
illness.' With only three justices available on his side, Marshall held the
case over. As he noted, the "practice of this court is, not (except in cases of
absolute necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases where constitutional
questions are involved, unless four judges concur in opinion."''
While Miln awaited reargument, a series of deaths and retirements resulted
in the disappearance of the Marshall Court-and the end of the possibility that
the New York law would be found unconstitutional. Justices Johnson and
Marshall died and Justice Duvall resigned. By 1837, the newly constituted
Court included a new Chief Justice, Robert Brooke Taney of Maryland, and
James W. Wayne of Georgia and Philip Pendleton Barbour of Virginia.
Marshall's biographer, Albert Beveridge, noted that "only one disciple of
Marshall remained, Joseph Story." 92 The North American Review, a
contemporary legal periodical, assured its readers that Marshall's death had not
meant that "night had fallen." Nonetheless, when it reviewed Miln and other
cases of the 1837 January Term, it concluded that "circumstances had begun
to cast their coming shadows.'
93
The Court's personnel was not the only change that could affect Miln's
outcome. By 1837, the Atlantic states had become increasingly concerned
over the apparent influx of poor immigrants. On April 18, 1836,
Massachusetts brought a resolution to the Congress requesting the passage of
a law to "prevent the introduction of foreign paupers in to this country." On
May 2, the Senate resolved to inquire into the apparent increase in pauperism.
As one Senator declared, citing a parliamentary investigation,
some parishes on their own accord, and without any authority in law, as it
seems, adopted the plan of ridding themselves of the evil by persuading the
paupers to immigrate to this side of the Atlantic. And whom, Mr.
190. 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 583 (1916-1919).
191. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834); see
BEVERIDGE, supra note 190, at 583. Justices Smith Thompson, John McLean, and
Henry Baldwin thought the New York law was constitutional.
192. BEVERIDGE, supra note 190, at 584-87.
193. 46 THE NORTH AMERICAN REvIEW 126, 127 (1838) (reviewing Richard
Peters' REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, JANUARY TERM, 1837). Frankfurter cautioned against viewing the
Court as "dramatic conflict between Darkness and Light: Marshall, the architect of a
nation; Taney, the bigoted provincial and protector of slavery." He noted that was an
error that "even the most sober historians" have made. FRANKFURTER, supra note 12,
at 48. Frankfurter's opinion on this article would have been most interesting.
[Vol. 61
58
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/1
STRUGGLE OVER IMMIGRATION
President, did they send? The most idle and vicious; furnishing them with
money, besides paying their passage, and then leaving them on this
continent.
By December 1836, the Treasury Department had filed a report with the
Senate collecting facts about "the deportation of paupers from Great Britain
and other places.""
In February 1837, the new Court heard oral argument in Miln. The
arguments made by counsel on both sides revealed the continued perception
that immigrants were "articles of commerce." New York City's attorneys
never argued that poor immigrants could not be "articles of commerce." On
one hand, they assumed passengers were commerce but argued for concurrent
state commerce authority. 95 On the other hand, they tried to distinguish
passengers in transit from passengers landed. Accepting that passengers were
commerce when in transit, New York's attorneys claimed that passengers once
landed became subject to state police powers.'96 The rationale behind the
lawyers' argument stemmed less from the logic of federalism than from
history. They pointed out that the New York law had existed for "nearly
thirty years, without, until now, a claim to object to its provisions or its
purposes."'97 To them, the existence of article I, section 9, the 1788 convict
resolution, and state laws relating to quarantine, passenger regulation, pilotage,
wrecks, "colored passengers and seamen," and harbors suggested that the New
York law had to be constitutional. 198
194. S. Doc. No. 24-342 (1836), H.R. Doc. No. 24-219 (1836); 12 REGISTER
OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS (1836), at pt. 2, 1378-1381; S. DOc. 24-5 (1836);
SANDERSON, supra note 161, at 50; HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 24-30.
195. Miln, 36 U.S. at 107-10, 113 ("the power to regulate commerce is not
exclusively in congress, but concurrent in the states; and that state laws are valid,
unless conflicting").
196. Id. at 110-11 (the law "is not a commercial regulation in the sense
contemplated in the constitution; but a police regulation"). Counsel argued that: "It
has been the policy of the general government, to encourage the emigration of
foreigners to this country.... [Congress has] the power to regulate the manner in
which they shall be brought here, under the power to regulate commerce .... But
when they once arrive in this country, they must submit to the poor laws of the state
in which they land; and with which congress have nothing to do. These laws have
always regulated them. . . ." Id. at 129.
197. Id. at 121.
198. Id at 111 (discussing article 1, section 9 as showing "that the states reserved
the power to admit or prohibit; and consequently, to regulate the admission"), 111-12
(discussing analogies to southern laws designed to stop "free negroes from being
introduced among slaves"), 112-13 (discussing 1788 convict resolution as proving that
"the admission of convicts may be prohibited, the mode of bringing passengers may
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Miln's lawyers had little patience with the argument that attempted to
justify the New York act by a history of similar legislation:
Let the array of state laws and state regulations, which has been presented
by the counsel for the plaintiffs, be examined by these principles, and they
will be found constitutional or void, as the examination will result. The
number of these laws will not protect them, if they are obnoxious to the
constitutional power of congress. They will all be in pari delicto, if they
so interfere. No precedent will sanction unconstitutional laws. The
argument, that a similar law of every state conflicts with the constitution,
only shows the extent of the mischief, and the greater necessity for its
cure.
199
They argued, instead, about future consequences. "The law of New York is
a prohibition of emigration; and if carried into full effect will entirely prevent
the entrance of all persons from abroad.. .." Referring to the discussion
of commerce from Gibbons that mentioned "transportation of passengers" and
employing the phrase "passenger commerce," Miln's lawyers seemed baffled
at what questions remained unanswered. The commerce power was exclusive,
the New York law was "in direct opposition to the power given by the
constitution to congress to regulate commerce," and they asserted, by the 1819
passenger act, Congress had "come in and occupied the ground." New York's
law added regulations on "the subject of passengers" and therefore was
unconstitutional.2"'
Although the lawyers had failed to take Marshall's apparent invitation in
Gibbons to argue expressly that passengers were not "articles of commerce,"
Justice Barbour was less reticent. Justice Barbour delivered the opinion of the
Court, upholding the New York law. Justice Thompson wrote a concurring
opinion." 2 The only dissenter, Joseph Story, invoked an eminent supporter
by noting that "in this opinion, I have the consolation to know, that I had the
entire concurrence, upon the same grounds, of that great constitutional jurist,
be regulated"), 114-115 (listing examples of state laws).
199. Id. at 119.
200. Id. at 120.
201. Id. at 116-21. Apparently unsure about the concept of the "police" power,
they added that even if "regulations may be both those of police and of commerce,"
when "commerce is interfered with by the rules of police," such state interference is
void.
202. Chief Justice Taney may have originally assigned the opinion to Justice
Thompson. When several justices disagreed with Thompson's concurrent state power
theory, Taney asked Justice Barbour to write a new majority opinion. BAXTER, supra
note 171, at 92-95. Note, however, Carl Swisher's point that Thompson's opinion is
written in the first person. SwIsHER, supra note 7, at 364 n.25.
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the late Mr. Chief Justice Marshall.""2 3 On the issue of the relationship of
federal to state power, each justice staked out a separate position: Barbour
relying on state police power;2 Thompson wavering between state police
power and concurrent state commerce power;20 5 and Story advocating
203. Miln, 36 U.S. at 161. The uncertainty apparent in Miln has not gone
unnoticed. With respect to the federalism issue, one commentator has written:
It was clear that the Taney Court was composed of two wings on the
commerce question, and probably of another, yet uncommitted segment.
Several justices found an attractive alternative, one might say escape, in
labeling the state law a regulation of police; there were some of these in
each wing.
BAXTER, supra note 171, at 94-95. The disagreement over the Commerce Clause left
Miln providing no clear precedent for the proper demarcation of a federal-state
boundary.
204. Writing for the majority of the Court, Barbour advanced a police power
thesis to uphold the New York law:
That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all
persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where
that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution...
That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden [sic] and
solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of
its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of
legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends... That all
those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may,
perhaps, more properly be called internalpolice, are not thus surrendered
or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of
a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.
Miln, 36 U.S. at 139. The New York law, therefore, was "not a regulation of
commerce, but of police; and that being thus considered, it was passed in the exercise
of a power which rightfully belonged to the states." To support his conclusion,
Barbour argued that New York had possessed such power prior to the Constitution and
that The Federalist No. 45 and Gibbons indicated that the states had not surrendered
the power by ratifying the Constitution. Moreover, the act fell within the police power
because it was a precautionary measure "against the moral pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and possibly criminals," and the "evil of thousands of foreign emigrants
arriving there." The police power being exclusive, conflict with federal commerce
power was impossible. Id at 130-43.
This article refers to the justices' theory as "police power" throughout the
discussion. In Miln, however, the justices employed a variety of terms to refer to this
power and the phrase tends to appear only when borrowed from Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons.
205. Thompson accepted that the regulation involved commerce and state power.
He noted that it had "in some measure" the "character of commercial regulations." Id.
at 153. Because the law did not conflict with any federal statute, it was unnecessary
to "fix any limits upon the legislation of congress and of the states" or "to decide,
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exclusive federal commerce power.1 6 Yet amidst these disagreements over
federalism arose the beginnings of a more profound disagreement over
whether immigrants were "articles of commerce."
For the first time in a Supreme Court opinion, a justice chose to
differentiate explicitly "persons" and "imported goods." Barbour's distinction
of earlier commerce cases rested on this difference. According to Barbour,
Gibbons had been about "vessels"; Miln was about "persons."207 In Brown,
the question involved "imported goods"; however, in Miln, the "inquiry" was
about a "right over persons." Barbour concluded: "[G]oods are the subject
definitively, whether the provisions of this law may be considered as at all embraced
within the power to regulate commerce." Recalling the 1788 congressional convict
resolution, Thompson asked whether "anything [can] fall more directly within the
police power and internal regulation of a state, than that which concerns the care and
management of paupers and convicts." He added that a similar law in New York had
been in force for nearly forty years, other states had passed similar legislation, and "to
pronounce all such laws unconstitutional would be productive of the most serious and
alarming consequences; and ought not to be done, unless demanded by the most clear
and unquestioned construction of the constitution." Thompson's conclusion that the
New York law was either a police regulation or an exercise of concurrent state
commerce power, rested on the remnants of statutes passed to regulate the commerce
in convicts and indentured servants. Id. at 143-53.
206. To Story, the commerce power was exclusive, not concurrent. The 1819
passenger act authorizing the introduction of passengers into the country represented
"a complete exercise of its power over the subject, as well in what is omitted as in
what is provided for." Thus, whatever restrains or prevents the introduction or
importation of passengers or goods into the country, authorized or allowed by
congress; whether in the shape of a tax or other charge, or whether before or after their
arrival in port, interferes with the exclusive right of congress to regulate commerce.
Although Story acknowledged, "in the most unhesitating manner," the existence of the
police power, he asserted that a state could not "trench upon the authority of congress
in its power to regulate commerce." Id. at 153-61.
Story had advanced a similar position in his COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION, suggesting that the "same means" may be resorted to by the state under
its police power and the federal government under its commerce power. In Miln,
however, he altered his theory. He may have realized that if the state could use the
"means" of regulation of commerce to protect itself, then Barbour's opinion might be
correct and the federal commerce power would be limited. Thus, in Miln, Story
suggested that the state's police power authorized certain ends-health, quarantine,
poor laws-but that the state could not use laws which regulated commerce as a means
to reach these ends. "A state cannot make a regulation of commerce to enforce its
health laws, because it is a means withdrawn from its authority." JOSEPH STORY, 2
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsITruTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES 514-15 (reprint ed.
1970) (1833).
207. Miln, 36 U.S. at 135-36.
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of commerce, the persons are not." Warming to the subject, he stated that
Congress could regulate imported goods after they were landed because "they
were the subjects of commerce":
But how can this apply to persons? They are not the subject of commerce;
and, not being imported goods, cannot fall within a train of reasoning
founded upon the construction of a power given to congress to regulate
208
commerce...
Despite the strength of these statements, Barbour himself was not completely
convinced that his conclusion would be accepted. His opinion also attempted
to distinguish between "passengers" who could be "objects of commerce," and
"persons" who cease to be "objects of commerce" and therefore can be
regulated by the states.2' Barbour was willing to express his perception that
persons were not goods, but unwilling to base his result completely on it.
Justice Story's dissent, expressing disbelief that persons were not
commerce, may explain Barbour's hesitation. Story quoted extensively from
Marshall's statements in Gibbons and concluded that "the regulation of
passenger ships, be in truth a regulation of trade and commerce." Implicitly
mocking Barbour's efforts at distinction, Story noted, "this language is the
more impressive, because the case ...was that of a steamboat, whose
principal business was the transportation of passengers."2 ' Brown supported
the same conclusion if "instead of the language respecting the introduction and
importation of goods, we merely substitute the words respecting the
introduction and importation of passengers."2 ' Furthermore, he pointed out
that, had the requirements of the New York statute been found in a
congressional act, "it would not have been doubted, that they were regulations
of passenger ships engaged in foreign commerce."2"2 Story saw no reason
to alter what he believed was the background assumption that people were
"articles of commerce."
The disagreement on the Court between those justices who continued to
believe that people were "articles of commerce," and the new position
hesitatingly advocated by Barbour that people were not imported goods was
208. Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 138-39. If the statute was a commercial regulation, no conflict
existed with the federal passenger act because the federal act affected "the passengers,
whilst on their voyage, and until they shall have landed." The New York law,
however, only applied "when they have ceased to have any connection with the ship,
and when, therefore, they have ceased to be passengers." Id at 137-38 (emphasis
added).
210. Id, at 155.
211. Id. at 160-61.
212. Id. at 156.
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highlighted by the subsequent appearance of Justice Baldwin's missing
opinion. In late 1837, Baldwin published a volume of his opinions, including
one missing from the official report in Miln, in a treatise discussing the nature
of the relationship between the United States government and the states.213
Baldwin's oblique explanation for the volume hinted at his discomfort at
discovering that the Court's decisions were so dependent on the Court's
composition. After the recent changes in the Court, Baldwin suddenly found
himself in a comfortable majority of like-minded justices.214
Baldwin sided with Barbour in the result. The Miln opinion appearing in
the volume, however, demonstrated his reluctance-perhaps shared by many
on the Court who agreed with the result-to endorse the idea that people were
not "articles of commerce., 215  One statement by Baldwin seemed
complementary to those of Barbour. Baldwin noted that "pauper[s] imported
from a foreign nation or another state" are not "articles of merchandise or
traffic, imports, or exports."216 Unlike Barbour, however, Baldwin could not
bring himself to argue that "persons" were not commerce. Indeed, he
recognized that people often were part of commerce. He accepted that the
"vessel" with passengers on it in Gibbons had been a part of commerce. 17
And he acknowledged that at some point "the vessel, the cargo, the crew, or
213. The treatise was modestly titled HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF
THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES DEDUCED FROM THE POLITICAL HISTORY AND CONDITION OF THE COLONIES
AND STATES, FROM 1774 UNTIL 1788 AND THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH OPINIONS IN THE CASES DECIDED AT
JANUARY TERM, 1837, ARISING ON THE RESTRAINTS ON THE POWERS OF THE STATES
(reprint ed. 1970) (1837). The volume contained a long introductory essay and
Baldwin's opinions in Briscoe, Charles River Bridge, Poole, and Miln. Miln appears
at 181-97. Baldwin's speed in publishing the volume is quite astounding. All four
cases had been argued in January 1837 and the book was published the same year.
214. He stated that when the four cases had originally been heard he had been
in the minority or bare majority. With the change in the Court, he found himself
comfortably in the majority. "Placed in a position as peculiar now as it was then and
since," Baldwin noted that he felt "called upon to defend it." Id. at 2. Baldwin's
mode of defense had an additional purpose. He sought to base Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution on common law principles rather than "books,
essays, arguments, opinions, speeches, debates in conventions and legislative bodies,
by jurists and statesmen, and by some who were neither." Id. at 3.
215. Justice Thompson's opinion is consistent with Baldwin's approach. See
Miln, 36 U.S. at 143-53.
216. BALDWIN, supra note 213, at 185.
217. Id. at 186. Justice Wayne would later argue that Baldwin had believed
persons to be commerce.
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the passengers on board" were in "commerce." '' Pulled in both directions,
Baldwin was left to insist on a distinction between "paupers" on land and
"persons" in commerce. Commerce could not "embrace" paupers.2"9 The
reason to him was apparent:
To my mind there can be no such cause for discriminating between an
imported and a domestic pauper; one is as much an article of commerce as
another, and the same power which can force them into a state from a
vessel, can do it from a wagon, and regulate their conveyance on the roads
or canals .... Laws excluding convicts and paupers are as necessary to
preserve the morals of the people from corruption .... .'0
In order to protect states' rights to exclude domestic paupers, Baldwin was
willing to allow them to exclude "imported" paupers. But, as his very use of
"imported" demonstrated, he still perceived most persons as "articles of
commerce.
221
Ironically, Baldwin, whose entire treatise was designed to refute the
relevance of current politics, revealed the reality of the Court's situation. It
was rapidly becoming impossible to maintain both that all people were
"articles of commerce" and to continue to uphold state power to exclude
certain people. Baldwin warned that certain kinds of state laws "must stand
or fall together, or some arbitrary unintelligible distinction must be made
between them, which is neither to be found in the constitution, or decisions
of this Court. 2 2  Baldwin's prediction of an "arbitrary unintelligible
distinction" soon would prove true as the Court moved towards explicit
adoption of Barbour's argument that persons, at least when they were white,
were not articles of commerce.
C. Groves: The Reason for Disagreement-Slavery
The move occurred because of growing tensions over slavery. In 1841,
a slavery case, Groves v. Slaughter,' clarified that the Justices' views over
218. Id. at 188; see id. at 184.
219. Id. at 184.
220. Id. at 194.
221. Id. Baldwin ended by insisting that the states retained power over internal
commerce.
222. Baldwin's suggestion was to distinguish "internal commerce of a state" from
other categories of commerce. He argued that the states had never surrendered their
power over internal commerce. Id. at 184. The quote actually refers to a slightly
different arbitrary distinction.
223. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841). Under traditional analysis, Groves could be
distinguished as an interstate commerce case.
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whether persons were articles of commerce, had become inextricably bound
to perceptions of distinctions between "persons" and black slaves. Groves
involved a claim by a seller of imported slaves that he should be able to
collect the money owed on a defaulted note used to buy the slaves, despite the
fact that Mississippi's constitution prohibited importation of slaves. The Court
decided 5-2 in favor of the seller under the theory that the state constitutional
provision was not self-executing. The Court thereby technically avoided the
commerce issue. 4
The case, however, had been largely argued as a case about commerce.
Indeed, the lengthy arguments of the lawyers had focused on whether or not
slaves were commerce. The Mississippi constitutional provision had referred
to "slaves . . . as merchandise." None of the lawyers disputed this
characterization. Disagreement arose over whether the fact that slaves were
property and "merchandise" meant that they were "articles of commerce" such
that Congress could regulate their transportation. On this point, the lawyers
agreed that the case presented "the most" "grave and important question" ever
brought to determination before the Court. 5
From Mississippi, Robert J. Walker argued that slaves were property but
not "articles of commerce." Walker accepted that states could declare slaves
merchandise and property. 6  Yet these laws did not mean that slaves
became "objects of commerce." Walker distinguished between "commerce in
merchandize," to be regulated by congress, and slavery, which was a
"[c]ommerce, if it may be so called, in persons" that was "local and
peculiar."' 7 Employing part of a southern defense of slavery that would
soon become popularized by George Fitzhugh, Walker explained that the
abolitionists had too long persisted uncontradicted in the "radical error" that
"slaves are designed to be deprived . . . of the qualities and characters of
persons . . . and to degrade them in all things to the levels of chattels, of
inanimate matter." 8 Walker added,
224. Groves, 40 U.S. at 449; see SWISHER, supra note 7, at 365-70. The dissents
were apparently not clear. At one place, the reporter noted that Story, Thompson,
Wayne, and McKinley concurred with the Court. Groves, 40 U.S. at 508. Later,
however, the reporter noted that Story and McKinley dissented. Id. at 517; see
SWISHER, supra note 7, at 367.
225. Groves, 40 U.S. at 647.
226. The argument of Walker of Mississippi in Groves appears at great length
in an appendix. For plaintiffs, see id. at 616 (declaring "slaves" as "vendible articles"),
639 (comparing slaves to cases involving ginger, butter, com, and coal), 650
(comparing the regulation of the transportation of slaves to "all other articles of
commerce"), 651-52 (discussing laws defining slaves as property to be "not regulations
of commerce, but of slavery").
227. Id. at 650.
228. Id. at 653.
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To call them chattels or real estate, no more makes them in reality land, or
merely inanimate matter, than to call the blacks of the north freemen,
makes them so in fact. When the constitution of Mississippi, and laws
made in pursuance thereof, require that slaves shall be treated with
humanity, command that they shall be well clothed and fed, and that
unreasonable labor shall not be exacted, are these provisions applicable to
a mere chattel, which the owner may mutilate or destroy at pleasure? No!
Citing Miln, he pointed out that the Court had "decided, that in contemplation
of the constitution of the Union, persons 'are not the subject of
commerce.'"229
Why was an advocate of southern slavery willing to use Miln to argue
that persons were not "articles of commerce"? Walker made the reason clear.
He explained that the northern abolitionists had a "strangely inconsistent"
argument. They
say men are not property, and cannot be property, by virtue of any laws of
congress or of the states; and yet, that as such, commerce in them among
the states may be regulated by congress and by congress alone.2"
If calling slaves "articles of commerce" would permit Congress, not the
southern states, to regulate slavery, Walker would insist that slaves actually
were "persons."
This argument left his opponents, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, with
the task of attempting to argue that slaves were "articles of commerce" without
appearing to be proslavery activists. Both men attempted to distinguish their
beliefs from those of Walker. Clay noted that, regardless of the decision, the
case would not affect slaves in Mississippi. He stated, however, "[i]t would
be gratifying to those who love freedom, if the negroes were free.""
Webster took a slightly different approach, dramatically asking how had
Mississippi chosen to prohibit the sale of slaves as merchandise.
229. Id. at 653; see id. at 668-69 ("the power of congress to regulate commerce
does not extend to 'persons"'). Henry Gilpin, the Attorney General, siding with
Walker, agreed that Miln demonstrated that "the regulation of commerce is intended
to apply to 'goods,'-to the articles that are strictly merchandize." Id. at 467.
230. Id. at 649; see id. at 647 (discussing abolitionists' petitions advocating that
congressional power over interstate commerce is exclusive). Walker argued in the
alternative that under Miln the power to exclude paupers as dangerous articles would
permit a state to exclude dangerous slaves. Id. at 665-69. Gilpin also argued, in the
alternative, that even if it were a commercial regulation, Mississippi could stop the
introduction of slaves under the police power or concurrent commerce power. Id. at
468-69.
231. Id at 487-88.
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"Emancipated? No such provision! The slaves were not to be set free." 2
But having made some declaration of apparent sympathies, the two men went
on to state that slaves were property and merchandise and, therefore, "articles
of commerce" under the commerce clause. As Clay explained, "the right of
congress to regulate commerce between the different states" extended "to the
regulation of the transportation of slaves... as merchandise."2 33
With the issue explicitly framed as one about an abolitionist position, the
majority of the Court declined the invitation to settle the debate. Justice
Thompson, taking advantage of Justice Barbour's death, avoided the question
Barbour had opened of whether persons were "articles of commerce." But the
"pressure for self-expression ...was too much for Justice McLean. 2 34
McLean, whose antislavery convictions were well known, 5 wrote a separate
concurrence. Yet McLean's concurrence, which attempted to place an
abolitionist spin on the case, revealed how complicated slavery had made the
issue.
McLean wanted to differentiate his legal perception that persons were
"articles of commerce" from the southern slavery perception that slaves were
property and merchandise and also from Walker's almost hypocritical claim
that considering slave "persons" as "articles of commerce" for Commerce
Clause analysis was dehumanizing. McLean began by agreeing with Webster
and Clay. McLean argued that commerce was "intercourse" and "as regards
this intercourse ... it is immaterial, whether the cargo of the vessel consists
of passengers, or articles of commerce." 3 6  The power to regulate this
commerce, as Gibbons had decided, was "exclusively vested in congress.""
He then disagreed with Walker. McLean asserted that his conclusion was not
inconsistent with a belief that slaves were persons. "The constitution treats
slaves as persons" and the fact that some states considered slaves
"merchandise" "cannot divest them of the leading and controlling quality of
232. Id. at 492.
233. Id. at 488-89.
234. SWISHER, supra note 7, at 368. Swisher noted that in Miln, "Wayne and
McLean, who wrote nothing to explain their positions, thereafter in case after case
heard counsel quote as the opinion of the Court the statement that persons were not
subjects of commerce, much to their discomfort as nationalists." Id. at 364. McLean's
discomfort may have equally arisen from his antislavery position.
235. Frank Otto Gatell, John McLean, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 535, 544-
45 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980); FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE
LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 188-
95 (1937); ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 243-49 (1975).
236. Groves, 40 U.S. at 506.
237. Id. at 504.
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persons." 8  Ironically, however, McLean concluded by agreeing with
Walker's conclusion: slavery was "local in its character" and laws regulating
admission of slaves were inherent to state sovereignty. McLean's concern,
unlike Walker's, was with the northern states' right to abolish and prohibit
slavery altogether. McLean could see no logic that would permit exclusive
congressional power over a commerce including slaves but that would not also
forbid Ohio's antislavery laws. 39
The tension in Groves over whether slaves and persons were "articles of
commerce" also appeared in Baldwin's opinion. A proslavery northerner,240
Baldwin had no doubt that Congress had exclusive power over commerce and
that the states had exclusive power over regulations of police, including the
entry of slaves. But unlike McLean and even Walker, Baldwin refused to
consider slaves "persons" in order to reach this conclusion. Other justices,
Baldwin noted, "consider the constitution as referring to slaves only as persons
..; they do not consider them to be recognized as subjects of commerce."
Baldwin explained that he "could not acquiesce." Echoing the solitary
position he had expressed in his treatise, he stated: "That I may stand alone
among the members of this court, does not deter me from declaring that I feel
bound to consider slaves as property."24' Baldwin felt so strongly that, for
five pages, he delineated all the evidence that demonstrated that slaves were
"articles of commerce."2 42 He proclaimed "wherever slavery exists, by the
laws of a state, slaves are property in every constitutional sense, and for every
purpose, whether.., as articles of commerce." Again, Baldwin's purpose
was oblique, but it may have been an early attempt to suggest that slaves
would be considered property under the Constitution. He noted that, although
a state could prohibit importation of slaves under its police powers, if "no
object of police is discernible,"243 then the power of Congress was to be
"conservative in its character, for the purpose of protecting the property of the
citizens of the United States."244
Had the only concern on the Court in 1841 been of federalism, McLean
and Walker, Baldwin and Clay might have agreed. All appearedto acceptthat
the states could regulate the admission of slaves: antislavery McLean
carefully insisted on protecting the rights of antislavery states to prohibit
238. Id. at 507. Webster had explicitly argued the other side: "The constitution
recognises slaves as property." Id. at 495.
239. Id. at 507-8.
240. See Gatell, supra note 235, at 571, 579.
241. Groves, 40 U.S. at 513.
242. Id. at 513-15.
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slavery; proslavery Walker also claimed that Congress could not regulate
slavery; and even the erratic Baldwin seemed to arrive near the same place.
But their disagreement was less one of federalism than of the perception
of what was a "person"-were Africans and African-Americans held as slaves,
"articles of commerce" or "persons?" No one lined up along an expected line.
Arguing for slaves as "articles of commerce" were northerners who moderately
opposed slavery such as Webster and Clay, as well as those who were
proslavery such as Baldwin. Arguing that slaves were "persons" were, to
some degree, proslavery Walker and antislavery McLean. Walker believed
slaves were "persons" in order to get them out of the Commerce Clause and
keep them slaves; McLean believed they were "persons" in order to get them
out of slavery altogether. Groves demonstrated that the Court would not
ignore the conflict between the statement in Gibbons that persons were
"articles of commerce" and Miln's statement that they were not.
D. The Passenger Cases: Decisive Disagreement
The Court soon acknowledged that the conflict would not be ignored;
unfortunately neither could it be resolved. By 1849, it became apparent that
the issue would prevent agreement in any case involving persons and
commerce. Whether "persons"-white British and European immigrants-
were "articles of commerce" became the central bar to deciding immigration
cases from Boston and New York. The Passenger Cases involved collection
of money and bonds from shipmasters. As in Miln, absences and deaths on
the Court forced postponements and multiple rearguments between 1845 and
1848. When the Court's 5-4 decision in the case was finally published in
1849, arguments of counsel and of the justices occupied close to three hundred
pages of the United States Reports volume.245 The laws were invalidated.
Disagreement, however, was so profound among the justices that the Supreme
Court Reporter wrote the pointed headnote: "there was no opinion of the
court.
2 46
The two cases reached the Court on the heels of recent national activity
involving persons and commerce. With respect to immigration, several new
congressional acts had been passed to ensure better regulation of passenger
245. The Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner, Norris v. Boston), 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849) (McLean, Wayne, Catron, McKinley, Grier in majority; Taney, Daniel,
Nelson, Woodbury in dissent); see SWISHER, supra note 7, at 383-84. Swisher notes
that Chief Justice Shaw had upheld the Boston statute as a police measure by citing
Miln and "Justice Barbour's statement that persons were not the subject of commerce."
Id. at 383. The arguments were not given in full by the reporter. Id. at 283.
246. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 283.
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ships.247 In the states, New York and Massachusetts had begun to centralize
control over taxes and duties received from incoming alien passengers.248
These activities respecting immigrants had a new context. The 1840s saw an
increase in immigrants, particularly those from Ireland, as famine, crop failure,
and potato blight sent many overseas.249 Slavery also became more
contentious. In 1843, the House Committee on Commerce concluded that
state legislation restricting African and African-American seamen from
entering southern ports violated the Commerce Clause.25 United States
expansion into the Northwest and the Southwest made Oregon, Texas, and
Mexico fuel for sectional conflict. The 1846 introduction of the Wilmot
Proviso, which advocated barring slavery in the territories acquired from
Mexico, kept slavery before the nation.'
Although the Reporter chose not to reprint the many arguments in the
case, his synopsis demonstrates that the problem of whether persons were
"articles of commerce" haunted every argument. An examination of merely
two of the lawyers' positions serves to illustrate. John Van Buren stated that
"passengers voluntarily immigrating into the country by sea or land can in no
sense be called 'imports.' 2 52 In opposition, Webster argued once again that
"commerce included the carrying of passengers. 2 53
In the opinions of the justices, the debate over persons as "articles of
commerce" was the critical issue. As Wayne stated, "the court means now to
decide" that "the commerce of the United States includes an intercourse of
persons, as well as the importation of merchandise., 254 It was on this point
that the five justices in the majority-McLean, Catron, Grier, McKinley, and
Wayne-seem to have agreed. All insisted that persons were "articles of
commerce." Nevertheless, their profound disagreements would prevent this
consensus from clearly emerging.
McLean simply asserted, and repeated throughout his opinion: "[t]hat the
transportation of passengers is a part of commerce is not now an open
question."' 5 He explained that "as a branch of commerce, the transportation
247. HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 34-38.
248. Klebarer, supra note 8, at 274-77.
249. JONES, supra note 107, at 92-93.
250. SWISHER, supra note 7, at 381.
251. See generally DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861
(1976).
252. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 290.
253. SWISHER, supra note 7, at 385.
254. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 412.
255. Id. at 401. McLean quoted Marshall's statement in Gibbons that no
distinction existed between transporting men for hire and property. Id. He repeated
this point later in the opinion: "the transportation of passengers... [is] a branch of
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of passengers has always given a profitable employment to our ships. 2 56
Distinguishing Miln (which he admitted he had assented to) as involving only
a shipmaster's report of names, McLean concluded that state duties and taxes
on foreigners were void under the exclusive commerce power.
Catron and Grier-whose views on slavery were respectively more
moderate than many proslavery southerners and more conservative than many
moderate antislavery northemers257-joined each other's opinions.
McKinley, who "remains virtually unknown," agreed with Catron.258 These
three agreed that persons were "articles of commerce. " 259 Indeed, all waxed
rhapsodic over immigration, declaring it a "cherished" policy of the
government.260
commerce, of which there can be no doubt.... ." Id. at 405.
256. Id. at 401.
257. Grier was from Pennsylvania and "conformed to the standard pattern of
most north Democrats of his era"-he was antiabolitionist. Frank Otto Gatell, Robert
C. Grier, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978:
THEIR LIvES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 873, 877-80 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel
eds., 1980); See Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoner, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1995). Catron was,
ironically, also from Pennsylvania but moved to Tennessee. Catron, who had
supported southern slavery in court decisions, was also a confirmed Unionist and for
federal power. See Frank Otto Gatell, John Catron, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978: THEIR LIvES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
737, 745-48 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
258. Frank Otto Gatell, John McKinley, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 769, 777
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980). McKinley was from Alabama. Carl
Swisher referred to him as the least outstanding member of the Taney Court. See
SWISHER, supra note 7, at 67.
259. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 442, 444,447, 450, 451 (Catron); 462,
463 (Grier). In a concurrence, McKinley focused on the migration and importation
clause, concluding that "two separate and distinct classes of persons" were the subjects
of the clause. Id at 453. Both are "subjects of commerce." Id. Slaves, however,flare not immigrants, and had no exercise of volition in their transportation from Africa
to the United States." Id. Immigrants, on the other hand "could remove at pleasure."
Id. at 454.
260. Catron noted that "the policy of drawing hither aliens . ..has been
cherished by Congress with rare steadiness and vigor" and has "filled up" the country
with a "respectable population, both physically and mentally." Id. at 440. Catron
made clear what "physically" referred to: "We have invited to come to our country
from other lands all free white persons, of every grade and of every religious belief."
d Grier's remarks were similarly focused on race. He noted that it was "the
cherished policy of the general government to encourage and invite Christian
foreigners of our own race to seek an asylum." Id. at 461. McKinley felt little
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Wayne likewise declared that people were "articles of commerce." As a
Georgian, Wayne accepted slavery under the Constitution, but he became a
Unionist during the Civil War.26' He argued that section 9 "recognizes that
other persons as well as slaves may be the subjects of importation and
commerce."262 So fiercely did Wayne believe that persons were "articles of
commerce" that he was willing to deny that Barbour's statement for the
majority in Miln was binding law. Wayne pointed out that any time Miln had
been cited "for the purpose of showing that persons are not within the
regulating power of Congress over commerce," he had stated that the point
was not decided.263 Wayne explained that "especially the declaration that
persons were not subjects of commerce" did not have "the assent of a majority
of the members of this court."2" He acknowledged that this precise
question of whether commerce included "an intercourse of persons and
passengers in vessels" had been raised in Miln.2 65  But, Wayne argued,
Barbour's majority opinion had never been assented to by Baldwin. Baldwin
had read the opinion late and objected "on account of what was said in it
concerning... what was commerce." Barbour unfortunately had already left
Washington and nothing could be altered. Wayne consequently counted Story,
Baldwin, McLean, Thompson, and himself as objecting to the view that
persons were not the subjects of commerce.266 With five justices in dissent
on the point, Wayne thought Barbour's statement was not law.267 What the
five-or at least three-justices disagreed over involved slavery.268 Grier
sympathy towards New York City, noting that if "by reason of commerce, a burden
is thrown upon our commercial cities, Congress should make suitable provisions for
their relief." Id. at 408. He believed that to "encourage foreign emigration was a
cherished policy of this country." Id. at 401.
261. Frank Otto Gatell, John M Wayne, in 1 THE JusTIcEs OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978: THEiR LIvES AND MAJOR OPINIONs 601, 607-
10 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
262. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 414.
263. Id. at 436. Some of Wayne's ferocity appears to have come from his belief
that Gibbons, "not surpassed by any other case in the reports of courts," had been
decided by "giants" and "rules the case." Id. at 437.
264. Id. at 430.
265. Id. at 431.
266. Id. at 432.
267. Id. at 433. According to Wayne, when a judge mistakenly agrees to
"dictum" but disagrees and then publishes his opinion, it cannot be "law." The
accuracy of Wayne's account of Baldwin's position is difficult to evaluate. Baldwin's
opinion seems less supportive than Wayne suggests.
268. Catron and McKinley remained silent on whether or not the states might
have the police power to exclude. McKinley's concurrence was joined by Catron.
McKinley noted that after 1808, "the power of Congress over the whole subject of
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was careful to preserve under the police power an ability of states to exclude
some people. He was even more careful to remark on whom he thought the
states could exclude: "lunatics, idiots, criminals, or paupers" and "free
negroes" who "endangered" "domestic security."2 69 Tom, like Grier, by the
politics of slavery, Wayne also would permit the states to exclude certain
people: "[Plaupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice." Moreover, those
who are "from a common ancestry and country, of the same class of men" as
"slaves," he explained, "are not within the regulating power that the United
States have over commerce."27 McLean seemed to have supported a similar
theory in Groves. Now, however, he appeared less willing to find exceptions
to exclusive federal commerce power. The police power of a state was "only"
to "be exerted under peculiar emergencies and to a limited extent."27'
McLean's move towards federal power was consistent with the belief he
expressed in 1848 letters that the Constitution prohibited slavery in free states
and the territories.2
To the four dissenting justices-Taney, Daniel, Nelson, and
Woodbury-persons, particularly immigrants, were simply not "articles of
commerce." Taney's and Daniel's extreme proslavery impulses and efforts to
distinguish slaves and free blacks from whites would later become even more
migration and importation was complete." Id. at 454. This power belonged
"exclusively to Congress." Id. The "perplexing" question of where this power ended
and the state begun was answered quickly. Passengers "can never be subject to State
laws until they become a portion of the population." Id. at 455.
269. Id. at 457.
270. Id at 426; see id. at 427 (arguing that the United States could not introduce
"emancipated Negroes from the West Indies"), 428.
271. Id. at 408. McLean was somewhat contradictory on the police power
aspect. Earlier he had stated that a state could guard its citizens against diseases and
paupers. Id. at 406. Yet at the end of his opinion he implied that Congress would
make "suitable provisions" for relief of seaboard ports if they were forced to face an
increase in pauperism, implying that they could do nothing themselves. Id. at 408.
272. Gatell, supra note 235, at 544; WEISENBURGER, supra note 235, at 189.
This theory is supported by McLean's oblique comment suggesting that some had felt
that Groves indicated that "slaves may be introduced into the Free States." McLean
had been the sole dissenter in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 658-73
(1842). His theory in Prigg was that in a free state "every man, black or white, is
presumed to be free." Id. at 671. In 1848 he had come to the conclusion that had
been reached in Somerset, that slavery only existed where declared by positive law.
If he had believed that Congress was without authority to declare slavery, he may have
come to believe that Congress could free slaves. He made this statement in letters
discussing his possible candidacy for the Free Soil (antislavery) presidential
nomination. He would later embrace this theory in his dissent in Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529 (1856).
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apparent in Scott v. Sandford when both explicitly stated that African-
Americans could not be citizens. 3  For both, Miln had decided this
case274 and Barbour's statement was good law.275 The two expressed
outrage that anyone could believe that white "freemen" were "articles of
commerce." Taney stated "imports and importation" "have uniformly been
applied to articles of property, and never to passengers voluntarily
coming."276  Daniel noted that "the term imports is justly applicable to
articles of trade proper,-goods, chattels, property, subjects in their nature
passive and having no volition,--not to men whose emigration is the result of
will." It would be a "perversion" to suggest otherwise.277  Having
proclaimed that white immigrants and slaves were in entirely different
categories, Taney and Daniel also made clear that the states could exclude
persons, most importantly freed slaves, under the police power.278
273. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-7 (Taney), 490 (Daniel); see Alfred L.
Brophy, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon the Constitution: Federal-State Relations
in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 192, 201-3 (1990); Michael Mello, Adhering
to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as
a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. L. REV. 591, 619-20 (1995); Finkelman, supra note 7, at
975. Ironically, but perhaps unsurprisingly, they would be joined by Wayne who had
so strenuously denied that persons were not "articles of commerce." Id. at 490.
Nelson wrote no opinion in the Passenger Cases. In Scott he would take a less
extreme position than Taney and Daniel, by refusing to discuss citizenship. See Frank
Otto Gatell, Samuel Nelson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1978: THEIR LrvEs AND MAJOR OPINONs 817, 824-25, 878 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
274. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 477 (Taney stating that "the court decided
that passengers clearly were not imports"); 515 (Daniel stating that "this case is
brought, not only within the reasoning, but within the literal terms" of Miln); 524
(Woodbury).
275. Taney and Daniel even rebutted Wayne's claim that the decision was not
binding by recounting different facts about the decision process in Miln. See id. at
487-89 (Taney); 515-16 (Daniel).
276. Id. at 476, 477-78, 480, 492-94 (emphasis added). Taney's concern was
with the possibility that, if they were imports, then there could be no duty levied upon
them.
277. Id at 506. Daniel insisted that "alien passengers, rational beings, freemen
... never can, without a singular perversion, be classed with the subjects of sale,
barter, or traffic." Id Daniel was fascinated by etymology. He began by noting that
"commerce" comes from "the Hebrew." Id at 501. Later Daniel interpreted "import"
as "within the gate." Id at 504-5.
278. Id at 474 (Taney arguing against a theory that would permit emancipated
West Indian slaves to reside in Southern states "ultimately leading to the most painful
consequences"); 477 (Taney); 507 (Daniel arguing that commerce power needed to be
interpreted to avoid the "mischief' of believing that the British could land "cargoes of
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The New Hampshire-bom Levi Woodbury also dissented. Woodbury's
political sympathies were "enigmatic." He was "suspected of being a
Presidential candidate, a Northern man with pronounced Southern leanings, or
at least, leanings toward slavery."2"' Like Taney and Daniel, Woodbury
distinguished "freemen coming of their own accord" from "men or 'persons'
who are property and passive, and brought in against their will or for sale as
slaves,-brought as an article of commerce, like other merchandise."...
Unlike Taney and Daniel, Woodbury seemed to imply that some whites,
perhaps convicts and redemptioners, could be in the latter category if "brought
in as property,-as slaves, unwilling or passive emigrants."28' Woodbury's
acceptance that a few white people might be in the "imported" category did
not change his underlying desire to ensure that the states had the power to
exclude "cargoes of shackled slaves," '82 and, "what is still more common in
America, in Free States as well as Slave States, [to] exclude colored
emigrants, though free."2 3 To Woodbury, if slaves and free blacks were
excludable, than so too were immigrants.284 His solution-a theory of
concurrent commerce power-would be adopted in 1851, after his death.285
The assumption that people were "articles of commerce" had turned half-
circle. Once indentured servants and slaves had been perceived to be articles
of commerce. By the eve of the Civil War, this assumption was explicitly and
heatedly contested. The deep pro-slavery sentiments of some justices meant
that Congress could not control immigration. Such a conclusion would
necessitate labeling white passengers "articles of commerce." To these
negroes from Jamaica, Hayti, or Africa").
279. Swisher, supra note 7, at 235; Frank Otto Gatell, Levi Woodbury, in 2 THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONs 843, 849-53 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds, 1980).
280. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 534-35.
281. Id. at 535; see id at 541 ("slaves are subjects of commerce, as they often
are" vs. "free passengers"). Interestingly, Woodbury suggested that "migration" might
have been intended to cover "slaves when regarded as persons" or "others, such as
convicts and redemptioners who came against their will, or in a quasi servitude." Id.
at 542.
282. Id. at 525; see id. at 540-41, 543-44, 566-67. Woodbury stated that "if
Congress ... can prohibit other persons as well as slaves from coming into States,
they can of course allow it, and hence can permit and demand the admission of
slaves." Id. at 542.
283. Id at 425.
284. Id. at 550 ("It is a mistaken view to say, that the power of a State to
exclude slaves, or free blacks, or convicts, or paupers, or to make pecuniary terms for
their admission, may be one not conflicting with commerce, while the same power, if
applied to alien passengers coming in vessels, does conflict.").
285. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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justices, such a label would reduce white passengers to the status of slaves.
The political fears of other justices about states being required to admit free
blacks or slaves fractured any consensus for a decision stating that immigrants
were "articles of commerce." Indeed, this complexity may account for the
Reporter's refusal to accept Wayne's statement that at least five justices had
concluded that persons were "articles of commerce." The circle would be
turned again, not by judicial reasoning, but by war.
VI. IMMIGRANTS ARE "ARTICLES OF COMMERCE"
The Civil War and Emancipation began to change the perception that
white immigrants could not be "articles of commerce." With the approval of
the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865, no longer could people actually
be held in slavery or involuntary servitude. 86 The 1866 congressional
approval of the Fourteenth Amendment similarly emphasized that those born
within the United States must be considered "persons."28 ' The potential
effect of these statements about "persons" became evident in 1867 when the
Supreme Court decided Crandall v. Nevada, a case involving interstate
railroads. Justice Miller described the debate in The Passenger Cases between
those who believed that "import" referred to "persons as well as to
merchandise" and those who thought it "had exclusive reference to slaves, who
were property as well as persons . ,,288 After implying that "citizens" at
least could not be "imports," the Court struck down the tax on interstate travel
without resolving the question of whether persons-be they citizens or
migrating foreigners-were "articles of commerce." When the Court returned
to the question almost a decade later, the Fourteenth Amendment had been
ratified and the Supreme Court had begun its role as the Amendment's
interpreter.289
These same years that saw legal language emphasizing that African-
Americans formerly held as slaves were "persons," also saw the rebirth of
forms of indentured servitude. In the Southwest, when peonage reappeared,
286. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see ERIC FoNER, A SHORT HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION 30 (1990); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:
THE CIvIL WAR ERA 840 (1988).
287. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLES TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 58 (1988); see
also Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979). The Fourteenth Amendment application of the word
"person" to "all persons born and naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof," left ambiguous the status of members of American Indian tribes.
288. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 41 (1867).
289. NELSON, supra note 287, at 58-59, 148-49.
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Congress moved to fulfill the promise of the Thirteenth Amendment by
passing the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, which barred "voluntary
servitude.""g In the West, some Chinese laborers were transported to the
United States under contract labor or credit ticket systems that seemed similar
to those used two hundred years earlier in the indentured servitude trade.29'
Since the late 1850s, Congress had expressed ambiguous concern over the
transportation of these Chinese laborers. In 1856, proposed House resolutions
referred to the transportation as "the slave trade of... coolies."" During
the 1860s, legislation alternatively prohibited and permitted transportation of
Chinese laborers under contract.293 People who had "fought to eradicate
black slavery" were horrified at the possibility of another system of bound
labor.2"' Yet to nativists, "the identification of Chinese laborers with
290. An Act to Abolish and Forever Prohibit the System of Peonage..., Act of
March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); see STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 181-84;
Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 437, 475 (1989). The Act did not end all forms of contract labor. For example,
the convict lease system continued in the South. See EDwARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE
AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY SOUTH 185-222
(1984).
291. As Lucy Salyer explains, "Whether a coolie trade actually existed in the
United States has been hotly debated, but most recent scholars argue that it did not.
Chinese either paid their own passage or bought tickets on credit .... Gary Okihiro
argues, however, that in practice the credit-ticket system 'was a scant advance over the
earlier forms of coolie and contract labor."' LucY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW
259 n.55 (1995); see CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE
CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
10-11 (1994).
292. Resolution of inquiry of April 7, 1856, 34th Congress, 1st sess., at 833,
quoted in HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 42.
293. The history of these acts is outside the scope of the article. Lincoln signed
legislation in 1862 to prohibit the transportation of Chinese under labor contracts. See
HYUNG-CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF AsIAN-AMERICANS, 1790-1990, at 45-46
(1994). Labor contracts exchanging one year's wages for transportation were explicitly
permitted by 1864 congressional legislation, thereby allowing "large numbers of
Chinese immigrants" to come to the United States. Id. at 52; HUTCHINSON, supra note
167, at 48-49; but see JONES, supra note 107, at 175 (arguing that Chinese laborers
usually paid their way). In 1869, the provisions were extended to other Asian
immigrants. HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 53-54. For a description of the
background of Chinese struggles in California during this period, see MCCLAIN, supra
note 291, at 1-42; Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in
Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529
(1984).
294. SALYER, supra note 291, at 10.
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American slaves," seemed to fuel hostility toward the Chinese. 295  Little
changed in the early 1870s as continual attempts to bar the trade as
"enslavement of the Chinese"2 96 coincided with a rise of anti-Chinese
sentiment. On March 3, 1875, Congress passed a five-section immigration
act297 aimed at what President Grant referred to as the "twin evils of Chinese
immigration: the coolie trade and the importation of women for
prostitution. 29R The act required the free and voluntary consent of
immigrants to their passage, once again holding out the belief that people were
never to be actual "articles of commerce."
As the Republican control of the House of Representatives ended in
1875-and with it the last of the Reconstruction-era civil rights bills
attempting to guarantee equality2 ---the Supreme Court returned in the
October Term to confront the question of whether persons were "articles of
commerce." Three cases raised the question of state efforts to control
incoming foreign immigrants. California legislation permitted the immigration
commissioner to require bonds for certain classes of Chinese women
immigrants."° New York and Louisiana still required shipmasters to present
a list of foreign passengers and post bonds."' The lists and bonds were the
same remnants of colonial indentured servitude legislation that the Court had
struggled over throughout the antebellum period.
This time the Court had no difficulty. In June 1876, in Henderson v. New
York, the Court stated:
[T]he transportation of passengers from European ports to those of the
United States has attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its
proportion at that time [of Gibbons] to other branches of commerce. It has
become a part of our commerce with foreign nations, of vast interest to this
country, as well as to the immigrants who come among us to find a
welcome and home within our borders. In addition to the wealth which
295. Id. at 10-12.
296. HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 56-59 (quoting President Grant).
297. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974). The act
required free and voluntary consent for importation, barred the importation of women
for prostitution, and voided the labor contracts.
298. HuTcH]NSON, supra note 167, at 65.
299. NELSON, supra note 287, at 149.
300. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875). The class at issue was
"lewd and debauched women." For a detailed discussion of the case, see MCCLAIN,
supra note 291, at 54-63. McClain points out the Justice Field spent most of his time
during oral argument, suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment's use of "person"
"proved an intention to place foreigners on a level of equality with citizens in certain
respects." Id. at 59.
301. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 267, 275 (1875).
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some of them bring, they bring still more largely the labor which we need
to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the latent resources of the
country . ... 302
The Court then asked, "Is the regulation of this great system a regulation of
commerce?" The question was rhetorical. Constitutional and congressional
legislation now appeared to bar people from being articles of commerce. The
legal perception that people could be articles of commerce seemed a mere
formal construct. Passengers were "articles of commerce." The Court struck
down all three state statutes.3 3 Federal immigration power over passengers
under the Commerce Clause was established. 3 4
As the more than one hundred years of immigration history since
Henderson demonstrates, federal control was not necessarily better for
incoming immigrants. Restrictions and exclusions continued, often more
onerous than state efforts, as in the 1882 exclusion act against Chinese
laborers. 0 5 Indeed, the Court's desire to uphold federal exclusion of
Chinese laborers led to a new theory of federal immigration power, this time
grounded in inherent sovereignty. 3 Bound labor did not disappear. When
it faded, the well-being of immigrants was not the central concern. The push
302. Id. at 270.
303. Id.; see also Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280 (Chinese women passengers were
also commerce). Both decisions left as an open question whether state restrictions in
certain instances would be valid. They, however, started a long line of cases stating
that interstate commerce included the movement of people and property. See, e.g.,
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913) (upholding White Slave Traffic Act
of 1910); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885) (striking
down a state tax on a ferry company that merely landed passengers in Pennsylvania).
304. McClain perceptively writes:
Chy Lung and its companion cases represented the most extensive and
definitive Supreme Court opinions yet on the subject of the right of the
states to regulate foreign immigration, and decisions since then have added
little to the principles the high court set forth in that case. These cases
represented a sharp departure from previous precedent, which was equivocal
on the subject and open to the interpretation that states still possessed
considerable authority in this public policy area. The three Supreme Court
decisions made it abundantly clear that the states had virtually no power to
affect it directly.
McCLAIN, supra note 291, at 62-63.
305. KIM, supra note 293, at 60-62; JONES, supra note 107, at 212-38.
306. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 606-8 (1889); see Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). The
commerce theory gave the federal government power over the states, but could not
justify federal exclusion of certain immigrants.
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for the 1885 Alien Contract Labor Act, making it illegal to prepay
transportation under contract, for example, was "a rallying point for anti-
immigration forces.""3 7 And the experience of African-Americans, Asian
immigrants, and Asian-Americans on buses, trains and other commercial
carriers indicated that being a "person" under the Constitution did little to alter
racism.
Yet the law had completed a circle. In the seventeenth century, few
would have doubted that the transatlantic migration of British and Europeans
was a commerce. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the decline
of indentured servitude and the rise in controversy over slavery suggested to
some that British and European immigrants should not ever be placed in the
same category as Africans and enslaved African-Americans. In the nineteenth
century, disputes over slavery entangled immigration in the web of cultural
perceptions of differences between slaves and other people. Only after the
Reconstruction Amendments formally barred people from actually being held
as potential articles of commerce under slavery or involuntary servitude could
the Court accept that immigrants were "articles of commerce."
For the twentieth century, the idea of "commerce" that includes people
as its objects has been a comfortable abstraction." 8 The Court has never
returned to alter the 1941 conclusion that the issue was settled. And perhaps
this story of the cultural roots of the Henderson doctrine does not demand
doctrinal change.
This story, however, does suggest that we rethink our understanding of
the roots of constitutional doctrine. The need to do so was apparent recently,
when the Court decided United States v. Lopez. Justice Kennedy accurately
commented on the doctrinal confusion in Commerce Clause cases:
307. HUTCHINSON, supra note 167, at 87.
308. The degree to which contemporary legal culture has forgotten the dilemma
over this question can be seen in a 1908 treatise on the commerce clause. Unlike
current treatises, the author perceived the need to address the question of persons
separately and as almost an exception to the general understanding of commerce. The
author stated that "commerce in its ordinary signification consists of sales of property."
In a separate section devoted to the "transportation of people," he adds: "Of course
human beings are not, under conditions of freedom, the subjects of sale so that
transportation of them would be included in commerce. But nothing is better
established than that commerce includes transportation of persons, as well as of
property." FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CoNsTITUToN 17, 20-21 (reprint ed. 1987) (1908); see also id at 88.
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The progression of our Commerce Clause cases from Gibbons to the present
was not marked, however, by a coherent or consistent course of
interpretation; for neither the course of technological advance nor the
foundational principles for the jurisprudence itself were self-evident to the
courts .... 10
A number of justices in Lopez tried to explain the erratic "history" of the
Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause.31 0 Justice Kennedy, for
example, suggested that the course of the Court had been directed by its
attempt "to resolve contemporary disputes by enduring principles."
31
'
Justice Thomas sought refuge in the belief of "the original understanding" of
"commerce." 312  Justice Souter alone attempted to trace, albeit without
notable clarity, the changes in the "Court's conceptions. 3 3 It is this last,
more difficult constitutional cultural history to which we, and the Court,
should strive. As this story of the peculiar migration to this country suggests,
the explanation for legal doctrine often lies, not in a faith in enduring
principles or a quest for original meaning, but in the twisted history of legal
assumptions, cultural perceptions, and social strife.
309. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
310. See id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the history of the judicial
struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause"); id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("discussion of the text, structure, and history of the Commerce Clause"); id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("a brief overview of Commerce Clause history"); see also id. at 1627
(Rehnquist, C.J., discussing the line of commerce cases beginning with Gibbons).
311. Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
312. Id. at 1643, 1646 (Thomas, J., concurring).
313. Id. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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